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The syntactic and semantic treatment of Chinese Bare Conditionals is a topic of 
much debate (Cheng and Huang 1996; Lin 1996; Chierchia 2000).  This dissertation 
investigates the nature of Chinese Bare Conditionals in three aspects: quantification and 
modal implications as compared to English free relatives with –ever, and pronoun 
occurrence.  With regard to quantification, I propose to treat the anteceding wh-phrase 
and its anaphoric element (pronoun/wh-word) uniformly as a definite description 
denoting a maximal plural entity similar to Jacobson (1995).  This entity can be an atomic 
entity resulting in a singular definite reading, or an entity consisting of more than one 
atom deriving a universal-like reading.  Concerning modal implication, I propose to 
capture the agent’s/speaker’s indifference reading of bare conditionals with von Fintel 
(2000).  Indifference reading in his analysis is interpreted against a counterfactual modal 
base which predicts a causal link.  His analysis is needed for the interpretation of Chinese 
bare conditionals but may not be applied directly to whatever, given that a causal link is 
necessarily present in a bare conditional, but not required in an English whatever-
sentence.  I argue that the use of a pronoun in a bare conditional is not subject to a 
uniqueness and existence condition as claimed in Lin (1996).  Although bare conditionals 
 vi
typically contain two identical wh-words, they may occur naturally with a pronoun that 
links bare conditionals with other sentences into a piece of coherent discourse.   
This account bears an important implication for the study of Chinese wh-phrases 
and third person pronouns in being able to predict the existence of anaphoric definite wh-
phrases and bound-variable pronouns in the language.  It also improves on existing 
accounts of Chinese bare conditionals in being able to capture the details of the form and 
meaning of this construction.  Chinese bare conditionals are structurally related to ruguo 
‘if’-conditionals and Hindi left-adjoined correlatives and their meaning is similar to, and 
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Chapter 1  
Introduction: Relations between Bare Conditionals, Conditionals, and 
Whatever 
 
 For over a decade there has been an extended debate on the syntax and semantics 
of Chinese Bare Conditionals.  The pressing issue with regard to their form concerns 
pronoun occurrence, while the controversy surrounding their meaning has to do with 
quantification.  Translations of bare conditionals often use English free relatives (FRs) 
with –ever (whatever, whoever, etc.), a construction associated with implications of 
ignorance or indifference (Dayal 1997; Fintel 2000).  However, this particular meaning-
aspect of bare conditionals is rarely touched upon in the literature of Chinese linguistics.  
This dissertation investigates the nature of bare conditionals in three aspects: 
quantification and modal implications as compared to FRs with –ever, and pronoun 
occurrence. 
 In this introductory chapter, I focus on discussing the link between bare 
conditionals, ruguo ‘if’-conditionals, and FRs-ever sentences.  While I motivate an 
account that links bare conditionals closely to whatever, I emphasize that the meaning of 
bare conditionals cannot be adequately captured by previous accounts based on whatever 
and ruguo ‘if’-conditionals.  Section 1.1 introduces Chinese bare conditionals as 
exhibiting a paratactic sentence pattern (i.e., sequencing of elements in a sentence 
without connectives/linking elements) commonly found in the Chinese language.  Section 
1.2 provides the first glimpse of the form and interpretation of bare conditionals that are 
unlike ordinary hypothetical ruguo ‘if’-conditionals.  Section 1.3 highlights the 
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similarities between bare conditionals and FRs-ever.  Section 1.4 introduces the problem 
with translation between bare conditionals and whatever, and reveals the fundamental 
differences between these two constructions that are in need of further examinations.  
Section 1.5 raises issues concerning the nature of quantification in bare conditionals 
including the distribution of non-interrogative wh-words and pronoun occurrence (from 
Cheng and Huang 1996; Lin 1996).  Section 1.6 provides an overview of the dissertation. 
 
1.1 Bare conditionals and Sentence Patterns in Mandarin 
In Mandarin, two sentences in ordinary discourse frequently occur without any 
overt linking element to signal their relationship.  We can notice that the form of Chinese 
bare conditionals reflects a Chinese paratactic sentence pattern that sentences in ordinary 
discourse exhibit.  Like the two sentences in (1a) (cf. Li and Thompson 1981), the bare 




                                                
(1) a. Wo si-le,       ni    zuihao zai     jia. 
           I     die-PFV you better   again marry  
         ‘*(If/when) I die, you’d better marry again.’ 
 
       b. Shei shang fengmian, shei  daomei.1   
           who on       cover        who unlucky 
           ‘Whoever is on the cover is unlucky.’ 
 
  
Though the English translation in (1a) cannot be grammatical without a connective 




is a common mode of discourse structure in Chinese.  This suggests that what we are 
studying is part of a general phenomenon in Chinese.  There is nothing peculiar about the 
form of bare conditionals that violates the general tendency of sentence patterns in 
Chinese.   
 
1.2 The Link between Bare Conditionals and Hypothetical if-conditionals 
When we think of conditionals, we typically think of sentences that take the form of if 
p, q as shown in (2a): 
 
(2) a. If David’s goat is in labor, then he will be late. 
 
The sentence in (2a) is an example of the most common kind of conditional structure 
discussed in the literature known as “Hypothetical Conditionals.”2  In a hypothetical 
conditional, the proposition expressed by the antecedent clause (p) specifies the 
circumstances in which the proposition expressed by the main clause (q) is true.  Thus, 
(2a) states that the possible worlds in which David’s goat is in labor are possible worlds 
in which he arrives late.  Also, the truth of the antecedent clause of a hypothetical 
conditional is typically unknown to interlocutors.  Hence, the hypothetical conditional in 
                                                 
2 Note that a wide variety of constructions can also have a conditional meaning.  For instance, coordinate 
constructions with imperatives as conditionals are well known as in Smile one more time and I’ll kiss you 
and Stop sleeping around or I’ll kill you.  Also, sentences with the form of if p, q may receive a wide 
variety of interpretations different from hypothetical conditionals include “relevance conditionals” (or 
“speech act conditionals”) like If you are thirsty, there is beer in the fridge and “factual conditionals” like If 
you are so smart, why don’t you solve the problem yourself?, etc. 
It is controversial how to best classify conditionals.  Most separate “indicative conditionals” like If 
the oil spill spreads to Florida shorelines, the whole world will be polluted, from subjunctive conditionals 
(or “counterfactual conditionals”) like If the government had placed a permanent ban on offshore drilling, 
we wouldn’t have the largest environmental disaster.  For the purpose of this dissertation, we take 
“hypothetical conditionals” as a general term for what we take typical conditional sentences to mean. 
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(2a) is most natural in a context where a speaker does not yet know whether David’s goat 
is in fact in labor.   
Crosslinguistically, overt marking of the protasis (the antecedent clause of the 
conditional) appears to be the commonest strategy (cf. Comrie 1986) but it is by no 
means necessary for conditional constructions to be overtly marked.  Mandarin Chinese, 
for instance, allows for conditional interpretation in the absence of any overt marking of 
conditionality: 
 
    (2) b. (Ruguo) David de   yang sheng xiaoyang,  ta  (jiu) hui  chidao.3   
           if            David DE goat bear    little goat   he then will late 
          ‘If David’s goat is in labor, (then) he will be late.’ 
 
Without the leading element ruguo ‘if’, the sentence in (2b) can still receive a conditional 
interpretation like the example in (2a) just described.  However, tense and aspectual 
morphemes are syntactically optional in Mandarin.  A sentence that does not contain any 
tense/aspectual morpheme can be used to describe a past event or an on-going event.  For 
instance, the sentence below can have a reading that says Zhangsan finished repairing a 
tape recorder, or it can mean that the repairing is still ongoing (cf. Smith 1997): 
 
 (3) Zhangsan    xiuli    yitai luyinji. 
       Zhangsan   repair  one   tape recorder  
       ‘Zhangsan repaired/is repairing a tape recorder.’  
 
                                                 
3 Note that the sentence in (2b) is not a bare conditional because its first clause does not contain a wh-word 
and its second clause does not have an element anaphoric to the first clause.   
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Likewise, in the absence of any overt conditional marking, a sentence like (2b) is 
ambiguous.  It can describe a fact stating that David’s goat is in labor (and) he will be 
late, and looses its conditional meaning.  
 At first glance, the structure of Chinese bare conditionals and that of ordinary 
ruguo ‘if’-conditionals look very much alike.  Like conditional sentences, bare 
conditionals are composed of two clauses: 
 
(4) Shei xihuan Zhangsan, shei/ta       (jiu)  daomei.  (Bare Conditionals) 
     who  like      Zhangsan  who/(s)he  then  unlucky 
      ‘Whoever likes Zhangsan will be/is unlucky.’ 
 
However, bare conditionals lack the morpheme ruguo ‘if’.  They also frequently occur 
without any tense and aspectual morpheme and their interpretations vary according to 
context.  The sentence in (4) can be used to predict that the individuals who like 
Zhangsan will be unlucky. 4   Alternatively, it can describe a fact stating that the 
person/people who like Zhangsan are unlucky as in the following context: 
  
(5) Wo gen  ni    shuo shei  daomei.  Shei  xihuan Zhangsan shei/ta    daomei! 
      I     with you say   who  unlucky  who  like      Zhangsan who/she  unlucky 
     ‘Let me tell you know who is unlucky.  Whoever likes Zhangsan is unlucky.’ 
 
The bare conditional in the context of (5) is felicitous and is not used to make a 
hypothetical assumption.  Likewise, the bare conditional in the context of (6) does not 
have a meaning of a hypothetical conditional but is simply about a fact: 
                                                 
4  It is possible that only one individual who likes Zhangsan, or there may be multiple such individuals.  
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(6) Ni    bie wen wo shuo-le    shenme.    Ni   shuo shenme wo (jiu)  shuo shenme. 
      you not  ask  me say-Perf. what         you  say  what      I     then say   what 
      ‘Don’t ask me what I said.  I said whatever you said.’ 
 
The ability to state a fact is a property of bare conditionals not shared by typical 
hypothetical conditionals.   
It is also important to point out that bare conditionals also differ from hypothetical 
conditionals with respect to the nature of their antecedent clauses.  The antecedent clause 
of a hypothetical conditional expresses a proposition.  However, the antecedent of a bare 
conditional is best translated as a NP (to be discussed in Chapter 2).  In (4), it denotes the 
individual(s) who like Zhangsan, and in (6), the thing(s) that the addressee said.   
 
1.3 The Link between Bare Conditionals and Whatever  
 Originally, Cheng and Huang (1996) claim that “bare conditionals do not bear any 
remote structural resemblance to typical relative clauses in Chinese” given that the 
relativizer de is never present in a bare conditional as shown in (7a) (p. 158): 
 
 (7) a. Ni   kanjian shenme, ni     jiu   hui  dedao shenme.  (Bare Conditional) 
           you see       what       you then will get      what 
           ‘You will get whatever you see.’5 
                                                 
5 The translation of this sentence provided in Cheng and Huang (1996) reads: If you see X, you will get X.  I 
do not use their translation because it cannot distinguish bare conditionals from ruguo ‘if’-conditionals.  In 
Chapter 2, we will continue to show that there are contexts where bare conditionals can occur but ruguo 
‘if’-conditionals cannot.  In Huang, Li, and Li (2009), bare conditionals have the following translations, 
although the link between FRs-ever and bare conditionals is not discussed (p. 367): 
 
 (i) Shei   xian   lai,      shei   jiu    xian  chi. 
           who   first   come,  who  then  first   eat  
          ‘If x comes first, x eats first.’   
      (Whoever comes in first eats first.) 
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       b. Ni   kanjian de,   jiu    shi ni     hui  dedao de.  (Relative Clause) 
           you see        Rel  then be  you  will get      Rel 
           ‘The thing that you see is the thing that you will get.’ 
 
The relativizer de is absent in the bare conditional in (7a) but present in its relativized 
counterpart in (7b).  Due to this structural difference, the authors do not consider the 
relation between bare conditionals, Hindi correlative construction, and English whatever. 
Even though bare conditionals do not involve relativization, this does not mean 
that bare conditionals, correlatives, and FRs-ever are entirely unrelated.  Historically, 
conditionals are derived from correlative constructions.  In many languages, conditionals 
are correlatives themselves. 6   A number of studies have suggested that conditional 
constructions are related to correlatives (cf. Geis 1985; von Fintel 1994; and among 
others).  The if-clause is the correlative clause, and then is a correlative proform.  In 
Srivastav (1991) and Dayal (1996), correlative constructions involve a free relative clause 
adjoined to the matrix clause and coindexed with a proform inside it as in (8a): 
 
(8) a. [free relative]i […proformi…] 
      b. [IP [NPi e [CPi what(ever) she tells me]][ IP I will do ti ]] 
      c. [if-clause]i [then i …]  
                                                 
6 As Bhatt and Pancheva (2005) point out that in languages where correlativization is a productive strategy, 
it is apparent that conditionals are correlatives (e.g. Marathi) (examples from Pandharipande (1997)): 
 
(i) dzar tyāne  abhyās    kelā              tar    to  pā    hoīl. 
if     he-ag  studying do.Pst.3MSg then he pass be.Fut.3S 
  ‘If he studies, he will pass (the exam).’ 
 
 (ii) dzo     mānūs tudzhyā  śedzārī         rāhto     to    mānūs  lekhak   āhe 
  which man     your       neighborhood-in  live-Prs.3MSg  that man     writer    is 
  ‘The man who lives in your neighborhood is a writer.’ 
  (Lit. ‘Which man lives in your neighborhood, that man is a writer.’) 
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In Srivastav’s work, English free relatives are provided with a similar structure (at LF) as 
shown in (8b) (same as Hindi left-adjoined relatives).  In Bhatt and Pancheva (2005), 
conditional if-clauses have the structure of (8c) that is essentially the same as Srivastav’s 
free relatives in (8b).7  All suggest a close link between conditionals, free relatives, and 
correlatives.  With this link in mind, one should not find it surprising that under our 
account, bare conditionals will be treated on a par with free relatives (as (8b)) despite 
their seemingly diverse forms (to be discussed in Chapter 2). 
Another important motivation for our account that relates bare conditionals 
closely to whatever comes from the observation that bare conditionals and whatever are 
associated with similar modal implications.  Dayal (1997) takes the role of the morpheme 
-ever as an indicator of a speaker’s ignorance (9a), not signaled in (9b) with a plain FR: 
 
 (9) a. There’s a lot of garlic in whatever Arlo is cooking. 
       b. There’s a lot of garlic in what Arlo is cooking. 
 
(9a) but not (9b) can be paraphrased as: “the speaker does not know what Arlo is cooking 
but the thing whatever it is that Arlo is cooking has a lot of garlic in it.”  Von Fintel 
(2000) argues that another function of the morpheme -ever is to presuppose indifference.  
The preferred reading in (10) below signals that the speaker grabbed the tool that was 
handy and he did so indiscriminately:   
 
 (10) I grabbed whatever tool was handy. 
                                                 
7 Specifically, they claim that if-clauses are plural definite descriptions like free relatives in that free 
relatives involve abstraction over individuals (following Jacobson 1993 and Dayal 1996), and if-clauses 
involve abstraction over possible worlds (following works such as Schein 2001). 
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Likewise, the sentence in (11a) has the preferred reading (11b) where Zack voted for the 
person at the top of the ballot without caring whom he voted for: 
 
 (11) a. Zack simply voted for whoever was at the top of the ballot. 
  b. Zack voted for the person that was at the top of the ballot, and if a  
   different person had been at the top of the ballot, Zack would have  
   voted for that person. 
 
Similar to the use of whoever in (11b) above, the Chinese bare conditional in (12a) below 
also has an indifference reading: 
 
 (12) a. Shei xiang chi tang,  Dawei  jiu   gei   shei/ta        tang   chi. 
            who  want  eat candy David  then give who/(s)he  candy eat 
            ‘David gave candies to whoever wanted to eat candies.’ 
 
        b. Shei   xiang chi tang,  Dawei  jiu   gei   shei/ta        tang   chi. 
  who  want  eat candy David  then give who/(s)he   candy eat 
           #Dawei hen   xiang  gei   Steve tang    chi. 
  David  very want   give  Steve candy eat   
‘David gave candies to whoever wanted to eat candies. David really wants 
 to give Steve candies to eat.’ 
 
The bare conditional in (12a) cannot be followed by an utterance that expresses David’s 
strong preference for wanting to give candies to a specific person (Steve) as shown in 
(12b).  When asked to identify the person/people whom David gave candies to, a speaker 
may imply that she does not know who the individual(s) is/are by uttering the bare 
conditional in (12a).  While it is the case that bare conditionals can also have an 
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ignorance and indifference reading, whether these implications are indeed what this 
construction presupposes remains to be seen.  Note that even though the main clause of 
the bare conditional in the example in (12a) has an agent, a bare conditional does not 
require the presence of an agent.  In Chapter 3 we will discuss presuppositions and 
entailment in bare conditionals that contain an agent as well as those that do not.   
 
1.4 Differences between Bare Conditionals and Whatever: Problems of Translation 
 Having said that bare conditionals and whatever are alike, some cautionary words 
are in order.  There are instances where the two constructions fail to converge.  The most 
obvious observation is that whoever-sentences cannot always be directly translated into 
bare conditionals.  For instance, the following bare conditional has been judged to be ill-
formed, while the English translation is perfectly fine (cf. Lu 1980; Lin 1996):  
   
 (13) *Shei  zhan  zai nali,  shei (jiu) hen  gao. 
           who   stand in   there who then very tall 
         ‘The person who is standing there, whoever he is, is very tall.’ 
 
Moreover, while the English whatever-sentence in (14a) begins with the main clause 
David will say, its translation can only use (14c) and cannot use the bare conditional that 
begins with the same clause David shuo ‘David will say’ as shown in (14b): 
 
 (14) a. David will say whatever you say. 
                    b. ≠ Dawei shuo   shenme, ni    jiu    shou  shenme. 
                  David  say     what      you  then say    what 
                  ‘You will say whatever David says.’ 
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          c. =  Ni   shou   shenme, Dawei jiu   shuo shenme. 
                  you say     what      David  then say    what 
                 ‘David will say whatever you say.’ 
 
In Chapter 3, I will discuss modal implications of bare conditionals and argue that (13) is 
well formed in a context where the causal link between the two clauses is imagined.  The 
problem with (14) is due to a structural restriction imposed by bare conditionals that is 
otherwise not required in whatever-sentences.  We will see that the strict sequential order 
of the clauses in a bare conditional gives rise to a default modal implication (the 
indifference reading) that is not necessarily associated with whatever.  After we bring out 
these differences between the two constructions, the puzzle of translation will be resolved. 
 
1.5 The Interpretations of Wh-words and The Problem of Pronoun Occurrence 
The issue of pronoun occurrence in bare conditionals cannot be addressed without 
a proper understanding of the nature of quantification in bare conditionals and the 
distribution of wh-words.  Chinese wh-words are not inherently interrogative but are 
indeterminate in meaning (cf. Huang 1982; Cheng 1991, 1994; Li 1992; Cheng and 
Huang 1996; Lin 1996, 1998; Huang, Li, and Li 2009).  Depending on the context where 
they occur, they may be interpreted as question words, non-interrogative existential 
indefinites, or universal quantifiers.  Standing alone, wh-words function as question 
words to initiate the discourse: 
 
 (15) a. Question: Ni   qing   shei chi fan? 
                     you invite who eat food 
                 ‘Whom did you invite to eat?’ 
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             Answer:  Wo qing     Zhangsan chi fan. 
                  I     invite   Zhangsan eat food 
                  ‘I invite Zhangsan to eat.’ 
 
         b. Question: Ni    zai    chi  shenme? 
                  you  Prog  eat  what 
                 ‘What are you eating?’ 
 
             Answer: Wo zai    chi  xiangjiao.  
                 I     Prog eat  banana 
               ‘I am eating a banana.’ 
 
It is immediately noticeable that unlike in English, the formation of questions in Chinese 
does not involve fronting a wh-word in the beginning of the sentence.  The wh-words in 
shei ‘who’ in (15a) and shenme ‘what’ in (15b) stay in-situ and do not undergo overt wh-
movement in syntax.8  The word order in questions is the same as that in answers.  
Alternatively, wh-words can also have a universal interpretation when occurring with the 
adverb dou ‘all’: 
 
 (16) a. Zhangsan zhege     ren,      shei dou xihuan ta. 
            Zhangsan this-CL  person  who all   like      him 
            ‘Zhangsan this person, everyone loves him.’ 
       
       b. Zhangsan shenme dou xihan. 
            Zhangsan what      all   like 
           ‘Zhangsan likes everything.’ 
                                                 
8 Huang (1982) argues that Chinese wh-words move covertly while in English, wh-words move overtly.  A 
Chinese interrogative sentence like ni mai shenme, literally, you bought what, with the wh-word shenme 
‘what’ staying in situ conveys the same meaning as its English counterpart--What did you buy. 
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Sometimes, wh-words in Chinese may receive an existential interpretation in a variety of 
contexts exemplified by the sentences in (17):     
 
 (17) a. Ni   zuowan    hezuijiu shi-bu-shi da-le     shenme ren? 
            you  last night drunk     be-not-be  hit-Asp what     person 
           ‘Is it the case that you hit someone while you were drunk last night?’ 
 
        b. Ruguo you   shei  xihuan ni,    tian hui  ta            xialai. 
            if         have  who  like     you  sky  will collapse down  
           ‘If someone likes you, the sky will fall.’  
 
Non-question wh-words that are interpreted as meaning something, somebody, etc., 
are termed “non-interrogative indefinites” in the literature including wh-words that occur 
in bare conditionals (Cheng and Huang 1996; Lin 1996; Chierchia 2000).  According to 
Cheng and Huang (1996), wh-words in bare conditionals are indefinite variables 
unselectively bound by a covert necessity operator: 
 
(18) a. Shei   xian   lai,      shei /*ta   (jiu)   xian  chi. 
                 who   first   come,  who/(s)he then  first   eat  
                 ‘If x comes first, x eats first.’  
           Unselective binding: ∀x (x come first → x eat first) 
 
         b. Ni    xihuan shei, shei/*ta     jiu     daomei. 
             you  like      who who/(s)he  then  unlucky 
             ‘If you like x, x is unlucky.’ 
             Unselective binding: ∀x (you like x → x unlucky) 
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Under their account, bare conditionals prohibit the presence of a consequent pronoun 
because the Chinese pronoun ta ‘he/she’ cannot be directly bound by an operator in an Ā-
position.  If it appears in the consequent clause of a bare conditional, it would have to be 
bound by such an operator (the necessity operator). 
 Contrary to Cheng and Huang’s claim, however, Lin (1996) presents the 
following examples to show that bare conditionals can occur with a consequent pronoun 
(p. 248-249): 
 
 (19) a. Shang ci     shei  mei jiang-wan, jintian  jiu    you shei/ta    xian kaishi.           
               last     time who not  talk-finish  today   then with sho/him first begin 
           ‘Today let’s begin with whoever did not finish his talk last time.’ 
 
       b. Shei shang xueqi       na   di-yi-ming, 
           who last     semester  get  top-one 
shei/ta  zhe xueqi       jiu   keyi  dan    banzhang. 
             who/he this semester then may  serve leader  
  ‘Whoever’s performance was the best last semester may serve as the 
         class leader this semester.’ 
 
Lin claims that bare conditionals such as Cheng and Huang’s (18) allow multiple possible 
individuals to satisfy the antecedent clause and the quantificational force is “similar to 
that of any”.  When the anaphoric wh-phrase is replaced by a pronoun like the examples 
in (19), the antecedent wh-phrase must refer to a unique referent that has the relevant 
property in the actual world and the “more than one person” reading disappears (1996, p. 
250).  Lin proposes a “Condition on Donkey Pronouns in Bare Conditionals” (p.251): 
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 (20) A donkey pronoun in a bare conditional is felicitous only if it picks out a  
  unique referent. 
 
Lin claims that the quantification in bare conditionals with a pronoun as in (19) is distinct 
from that in bare conditionals with a second wh-word (an indefinite) as in (18).   
In Chapter 2, we will apply a number of linguistic tests to show that wh-phrases in 
bare conditionals share more characteristics with definites than with indefinites.  We will 
argue that as far as quantification is concerned, a bare conditional with two identical wh-
words is no different from that with a pronoun in the consequent clause.  In Chapter 4, we 
will review previous analyses in detail and examine uses of pronouns outside of 
conditional sentences.  We will show that the use of pronouns in general is not subject to 
Lin’s constraint in (20) and will suggest several possibilities for the justification of 
pronoun occurrence in bare conditionals. 
 
1.6 Summery and Outline of the Dissertation 
In this chapter, I gave the initial motivation for an account that relates bare 
conditionals to FRs-ever, but suggested that the meaning of bare conditionals cannot be 
adequately captured by previous accounts based on English whatever.  Although bare 
conditionals appear similar to ordinary ruguo ‘if’-conditionals in the forms they exhibit, 
they differ greatly in displaying the following semantic properties.  First, a hypothetical 
if-conditional is typically used to make a hypothetical assumption, while a bare 
conditional is not.  Secondly, the antecedent clause of a hypothetical conditional 
expresses a proposition, while in a bare conditional it is best translated as a NP 
ambiguous between a singular definite and a plural definite (universal) reading.  
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Crucially, bare conditionals share many characteristics with FRs-ever including their 
association with ignorance and indifference modal implications.  However, I raised some 
problems with translation between the two constructions.  Then, I suggested several areas 
that are in need of further investigation to explain the differences between bare 
conditionals and whatever, and to solve the puzzle of pronoun occurrence in bare 
conditionals.  The conclusion of this chapter brings us to the following questions that the 
remaining of this dissertation will tackle:  
 
1. How do Chinese bare conditionals relate semantically to FRs-ever? 
2. What is the nature of wh-phrases in bare conditionals?  Do wh-phrases in 
     bare conditionals differ from non-interrogative wh-indefinites? 
3. What are the constraints on pronoun occurrence in bare conditionals? 
 
Chapter 2 and 3 will address the first issue.  The answer to the second question will be 
provided in Chapter 2.  Chapter 4 will discuss the third problem.  The central claims to be 
made and the basic structure of the remaining chapters are summarized and outlined as 
follows: 
 
Chapter 2 reexamines the nature of quantification in bare conditionals.  It shows that wh-
words in bare conditionals display properties of definites and provides an implementation 
of Jacobson’s 1995 account for English FRs to analyze the antecedent wh-phrase and its 
anaphoric element (either a pronoun or another occurrence of the same wh-word) 
uniformly as definites.  The present account is able to predict the existence of anaphoric 
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definite wh-phrases in naturally occurring data.  It also bears an implication for the study 
of the distribution of Chinese wh-phrases for being able to provide an explanation to the 
puzzle raised in Lin (1998).  
  
Chapter 3 investigates the meaning of bare conditionals including presupposition, 
entailment, and modal flavor attributed by wh-words in Chinese bare conditionals 
drawing comparison with English FRs with -ever.  I sketch an account that takes the 
analysis of von Fintel (2000) for English whatever as its basis.  I apply the projection 
tests introduced in Beaver and Zeevat (2007) to study the projection behavior of the 
ignorance and indifference “presupposition” of whatever.  I show that modal implication 
of ignorance associated with whatever is not a classic case of presupposition, but an 
implicature that is accommodated when certain conditions for the use of whatever are 
met in the common ground.  I claim that bare conditionals necessarily force a causal 
interpretation of the conjuncts and always entail indifference.  English whatever-
sentences do not have this requirement.  This difference between bare conditionals and 
whatever-sentences contributes to the problem of translation between the two 
constructions.  While the morpheme –ever is the source of the ignorance and indifference 
readings, it is the causal link between the two conjuncts in bare conditionals and the 
function of wh-words to signal ignorance that supply these additional modal flavors. 
 
Chapter 4 addresses the issue of pronoun occurrence in bare conditionals.  It shows that 
pronoun occurrence in bare conditionals is constrained by principles that govern 
discourse cohesion rather than restricted solely by the grammar of bare conditionals.  It 
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also suggests that speakers’ preference for parallel constructions may have contributed to 
the incompatibility between a pronoun and a bare conditional. 
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Chapter 2  
Quantification of Chinese Bare conditionals 
 
 This chapter reexamines the nature of quantification in bare conditionals.  It 
argues that contrary to the claim made in the works of Cheng and Huang (1996) and Lin 
(1996), wh-words in bare conditionals do not display characteristics of indefinites that 
lack an inherent quantificational force.  Although there is a long tradition of analyzing 
non-interrogative wh-phrases as indefinites, I argue that wh-phrases in bare conditionals 
pattern with definites and that an account similar to Jacobson’s 1995 analysis for English 
free relatives can capture the quantificational force of wh-phrases in bare conditionals 
adequately.  The present account has several advantages over previous ones.  Not only is 
it able to predict the existence of anaphoric definite wh-phrases in naturally occurring 
data but it also bears an important implication in the study of wh-phrases and bare NPs in 
Chinese. 
This chapter is organized as follows: Section 2.1 uncovers the nature of wh-words 
in bare conditionals as definites.  Section 2.2 proposes to treat the antecedent wh-phrase 
in a bare conditional and its anaphoric element (either a pronoun or another occurrence of 
the same wh-word) uniformly as a definite similar to Jacobson (1995).  Section 2.3 
discusses a prediction and an implication of the present account.   
 
2.1 Wh-words in Bare Conditionals as Definite Descriptions 
For the purpose of this dissertation, definites will be taken to mean definite 
descriptions that are phrases of the form ‘the F’.  Indefinites will be phrases of the form 
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‘an F’.  In Chinese, expressions that take the form nei-NP ‘that-NP’ or zhe-NP ‘this-NP’ 
may be used to signal definiteness while those that take the form yi-NP ‘one-NP’ may be 
used to signal indefiniteness.  In this section, I argue that unlike indefinites that are 
known to pick up the quantificational force of whichever adverb of quantification they 
are in the scope of, wh-words in bare conditionals lack a quantificational variability 
(henceforth, QV) reading in the presence of quantificational adverbs.  In addition, I show 
that wh-words in bare conditionals have the following properties of definites: (i) they 
exhibit a definiteness-effect for being incompatible with the existential marker you ‘have’; 
(ii) they are not subject to the novelty condition; (iii) they are able to pick up familiar 
discourse referents. 
 
2.1.1 The Problem with Unselective Binding: Wh-words ≠ Indefinites 
Within the DRT framework (e.g., Heim 1982; Kamp and Reyle 1993), indefinites 
are variables.9  In the presence of an adverb of quantification (Q-adverb), they can get 
bound by it and inherit its quantificational force.  In structures involving adverbs of 
quantification, indefinite NPs display a variable quantificational force.  Consider the 
following sentences:  
  
 (21) a. A cat always/usually/never chases a mouse.    
         b. If a cat sees a mouse, it always/usually/never chases it. 
 
                                                 
9 Before DRT, indefinites were analyzed as existentially quantified terms since Frege and Russell.  For 
instance, the interpretation of the indefinite a student in the sentence below involves an existential 
quantifier: 
 
(i) A student came.  Interpretation: ∃x [ student (x) & came (x)] 
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Depending on which adverb of quantification we pick, (21a) seems to say that all, most, 
or no cats chase mice.  The example in (21b) has a similar reading.  This is the 
phenomenon of quantificational variability (QV).  If wh-words in bare conditionals are 
really indefinites without their own quantificational force, we would expect them to pick 
up the quantificational force of whichever adverb of quantification they are in the scope 
of.  However, this prediction is not born out in the case of bare conditionals.  The 
examples in (22a) and (22b) do not have a QV-reading in the presence of quantificational 
adverbs: 
 
 (22) a. Tongchang shei wan dao,   wo  jiu    da shei/ta. 
                  usually       who late  arrive I    first  hit who/him/her 
                 ‘Usually I hit whoever arrives late.' 
           = On most occasions, I hit indifferently everyone/ the person who   
  arrive(s) late. 
           ≠ I hit most people who arrive late. 
 
        b. Tongchang shei   xian  lai,       shei/ta        (jiu)   xian  chi.   
             usually      who   first   come,  who/he/she then   first  eat  
            ‘Usually whoever comes first can eat first.'  
  = On most occasions, everyone/the person who come(s) first can eat first. 
  ≠ Most people come first, can eat first. 
 
Note that in the English translation, we also do not get a QV-reading with whoever 
sentences in both examples in (22).  English free relatives (FRs) with -ever are commonly 
analyzed as definite descriptions (Jacobson 1995; Dayal 1995, 1997; Von Fintel 2000; 
Tredinnick 2005).  Definite descriptions including universal expressions are known not to 
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interact with adverbs of quantification in lacking a QV-reading.  There is reason to 
believe that wh-phrases in bare conditionals are better treated as definite descriptions 
rather than indefinite variables without inherent quantificational force.   
 
2.1.2 Bare Conditionals are Incompatible with the Existential You ‘have’  
 Basic existential sentences assert the existence or non-existence of what the NP 
denotes.  In an English existential there-sentence, there occupies the subject position and 
the canonical subject occurs after the verb be. 10   In Chinese, existential sentences 
typically begin with the existential verb you ‘have’ without a subject: 
 
 (23) a. You   yige ren   hen   xihuan  ni. 
             have  one  man very  like      you 
              Lit. ‘There is a man who likes you very much.’ 
 
         b. You    ren       lai      le. 
              have  person  come PFV 
              Lit. ‘There came a person.’ 
 
Huang (1987) observes that Chinese existential sentences, as in English and every other 
language, cannot contain definite NPs and they exhibit the Definiteness Effect. 11  
                                                 
10 Existential sentences are said without putting any stress on there.  If there is accented, these sentences 
will receive a second reading in which there is used referentially (see Pierrehumbert 1980).  Here we are 
not concerned with the second reading. 
 
11 Hu and Pan (2007) discuss cases where definites occur in the post existential you-position.  However, 
they do not belong to the basic existential sentences under our discussion here since those cases must 
contain a focus particle.  An example of an existential you-sentence with a focused definite NP marked by 





Contrary to (23), examples in (24) are ungrammatical by virtue of containing definite 
NPs: 
 (24) a. *You  neige ren   hen   xihuan ni. 
    have that    man very like      you 
    Lit. ‘There is that man who likes you very much.’ 
 
         b. *You   zhege     ren       lai      le. 
                have  this-CL person  come PFV 
     Lit. ‘There came the person.’ 
 
The contrast between (23) and (24) indicates that indefinite NPs in Chinese can be 
preceded by you ‘have’ while definite NPs cannot. 
 Like definites and unlike indefinites, wh-words in bare conditionals are not able to 
occur with the existential you ‘have’:  
 
 (25) *You  shei   xian  lai,       shei   (jiu)   xian  chi. 
               have who   first  come,  who   then   first  eat  
                    ‘Whoever comes first, eats first.’ 
 
While in (23), the indefinite NP yige ren ‘a man’ is acceptable in the existential sentence, 
the wh-word in the antecedent clause of the bare conditional in (25) preceded by the 
existential morpheme you ‘have’ is ruled out.   
Note that outside of bare conditionals, the morpheme you ‘have’ can precede a 
wh-question word as in the following example:   
                                                                                                                                                 
 (i) Hai             you   nage       ren/Zhangsan. 
                  in addition have  that-CL man/Zhangsa 
     ‘There is in addition that man/Zhangsan.’ 
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(26) Ni     jiali      you   shei? 
        you   house   have who 
        ‘Who are there in your house/family?’ 
 
This shows that the occurrence of you shei ‘have who’ is permitted by the grammar of 
Chinese.  It is only in a bare conditional, you ‘have’ cannot precede shei ‘who’.12 
 Definite NPs are prohibited in the existential construction, a property not shared 
by indefinite NPs.  However, previous accounts analyze wh-words uniformly as 
indefinites in both bare conditionals and ruguo ‘if’-conditionals despite the fact that the 
two constructions are in complementary distribution with regard to their compatibility 
with the existential morpheme you ‘have’.  Consider the following example: 
 
 (27) Ruguo you   shei   xian  lai,       ta      (jiu)   xian  chi 
         if         have who   first  come,  who   then  first  eat 
         ‘If someone comes first, he then can eat first.’  
 
The bare conditional in (25) with existential you ‘have’ preceding shei ‘who’ is ruled out 
while the ruguo ‘if’-conditional in (27) is well-formed.  I believe that the contrast 
between (25) and (27) suggests that wh-words behave like definites in bare conditionals 
but like indefinites in ruguo ‘if’-conditionals.  Other differences between wh-words in 
bare conditionals and those in ruguo ‘if’-conditionals are discussed in Section 2.1.5. 
 
2.1.3 Wh-words in Bare Conditionals & the Novelty Condition 
                                                 
12 I thank Steve Wechsler for pointing this out (p.c.). 
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 Under the standard DRT account indefinites lack an inherent quantificational 
force and are assimilated to variables (e.g., Heim 1982; Deising 1992; Kamp and Reyle 
1993).  Unlike other variables (e.g., pronouns, traces and other definite NPs), indefinites 
introduce novel variables.  Indefinites are subject to the “novelty condition”, i.e., the 
referent of an indefinite description must NOT be familiar (Heim 1982).13  In other words, 
indefinites must introduce novel variables.  For instance, one cannot say (28a) meaning 
(28b) (cf. Chierchia 2000): 
 
 (28) a. I saw a cat and John also saw a cat. 
         b. I saw a cat and John also saw it. 
 
By subscribing to the novelty condition, we expect both occurrences of the indefinite a 
cat to introduce novel variables thus preventing (28a) to have the interpretation of (28b).   
 With the novelty condition in mind, let us consider again Cheng and Huang’s 
treatment of wh-words in bare conditionals as indefinites.  If wh-words are genuine 
indefinites, they ought to be subject to the novelty condition.  We would expect them to 
introduce novel variables in both conjuncts.  However, as Chierchia (2000) points out, 
this prediction only holds for the wh-word in the anteceding clause but not in the 
                                                 
13 Indefinites get their quantificational force from Q-adverbs (which may be null) that bind free variables 
associated with indefinites in their scope.  Consider the following example (from Chierchia 2000): 
 
(i) I own a mouse and a cat. 
          a. If a dog sees a cat, it barks at it. 
     b. If a dog sees the cat/that cat, it barks at it. 
   
The variable introduced by the definite NP in (b) cannot be bound by the Q-adverb while the variable 
associated with the indefinites in (a) can. 
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consequent clause.  If wh-words could be associated with an old variable in the 
antecedent of an if-conditional, we could get a case such as the following (p. 17):14 
 
 (29) A studenti walked in. If whoi walks in, I will greet who. 
 
Such a sentence would wind up with the wrong meaning (p. 17):  
 
 (29’) A student walked in; if he walks in, I greet him.  
 
The desired reading requires us to stipulate that a wh-word must introduce a novel-
variable in the antecedent clause of a conditional but a non-novel variable in the 
consequent clause.  Cheng and Huang’s analysis of wh-words in bare conditionals creates 
a phenomenon which our theory of indefinites cannot account for.  As Chierchia notes, 
novelty is generally absolute, not context dependent.  Here we will not consider 
Chierchia’s treatment of wh-words in bare conditionals because it relies heavily on the 
work of Cheng and Huang (1996) that takes wh-words in bare conditionals to be 
indefinite variables.15  I believe that wh-words in bare conditionals do not pose a threat to 
                                                 
14 Note that the example in (29) is taken from Chierchia (2000) (his (33)) as a generic example to show that 
if wh-words in bare conditionals are indefinites, they ought to be subject to the novelty condition in the 
antecedent clause as well as in the consequent clause.  However, as we will soon see that the example in 
(29) cannot be used to represent a bare conditional because a bare conditional does not occur with the 
morpheme ruguo ‘if’.  This means that using a bare conditional to translate (29) is not possible.  That is, 
when we put the morpheme ruguo ‘if’ in front of a bare conditional, we produce an ill-formed sentence: 
 
(i) You  yige xuesheng jinlai-le.    *You  shei  jinlai, wo  jiu   gen   shei dazhaohu.  
       have one  student    come-Perf    have who  come  I    then with  who greet 
       ‘A student walked in.  If who walks, I will greet who.’ 
  
15 Wanting to dispense with the novelty condition, Chierchia alternatively suggests that the two wh-words 
are existentially bound in the first place, and only later subject to existential disclosure which in turn leaves 
the wh-words bound by a universal quantifier (2000, p.36). 
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our theory of indefinites.  Wh-words in bare conditionals are not subject to the novelty 
condition because they are definites.   
 The problem of associating the wh-word in the antecedent clause of the bare 
conditional with an old variable in (29) disappears after we take away the morpheme 
ruguo ‘if’ ((30) will be translated into the bare conditional in (31) shortly below): 
 
  (30) A studenti walked in. Whoi walked in, I will greet whoi. 
 
As a contrast to (29) which produces an undesired reading in (29’), the sentence in (30) 
produces a desired reading in (30’) below: 
 
(30’) A studenti walked in. The mani/Hei walked in, I will greet himi. 
 
Such a reading is derived by associating the wh-word in the anteceding clause of (30) 
with an old variable introduced by a student.  The contrast between (29) and (30) also 
casts doubt on Cheng and Huang’s claim that both wh-words in a bare conditional are 
indefinites and further reveals that it is inadequate to translate bare conditionals into 
ruguo ‘if’-conditionals.  When using a whoever-sentence to capture the meaning of the 
intended bare conditional in (30), we get the right result: 
 
 (31) You  yige xuesheng jinlai-le.     Sheii jinlai, wo jiu    gen   sheii dazhaohu. 
           have one  student    come-Perf  who  come  I    then with  who greet 
          ‘A studenti walked in.  I will greet whoeveri just walked in.’ 
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Both wh-words in the bare conditional in (31) are associated with the old variable 
introduced by yige xuesheng ‘a student’.  This is not a property of indefinites.  As 
definites, wh-words in bare conditionals can be associated with old variables and are not 
subject to the novelty condition just as what our theory of indefinites would predict. 
  
2.1.4 The Association of Wh-words with Old Discourse Referents  
 Let us consider the differences between the distribution of wh-words in bare 
conditionals and that of ordinary indefinite NPs and wh-words in ruguo ‘if’-conditionals 
with a few more examples.  In the theory of Heim (1982), definite NPs carry familiarity 
presuppositions while indefinites do not. 16   Definites presuppose that there is a 
corresponding discourse referent in the common ground (familiarity) while indefinites 
presuppose that there is no such referent (novelty).  For instance, in (32) below, the 
definite NP the glass refers to the glass that broke last night and picks up an old referent: 
 
    (32) A wine glass broke last night. The glass had been very expensive. 
 
In contrast to definites, indefinite NPs are associated with novel referents.  In so far as a 
speaker wishes to refer to the glass that broke last night, the use of an indefinite NP is 
infelicitous (see also Roberts 2003):   
 
 (33) #A wine glass broke last night. A glass had been very expensive. 
 
                                                 
16 It is a commonly held view that a definite description signals a familiar referent.  See also Kamp (1981), 
for instance, for the familiarity theory of definiteness. 
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The infelicitous use of the indefinite a glass to pick up a familiar referent results in a 
piece of ill-formed discourse shown in (33).   
In Chinese, an indefinite yi-NP ‘one-NP’ cannot occur in the subject position 
unless it is preceded by the existential you ‘have’ (Chao 1968; Li & Thompson 1981; 
Huang 1987 and others).17  The example in (34a) below is ungrammatical simply because 
the indefinite NP yi-zhi mao ‘a cat’ occurs alone without the existential you ‘have’:   
 
(34) a. *Yi-zhi     mao,  bei        wode linju        sha-le. 
              one-CL  cat      Passive my    neighbor kill-Perf 
   ‘A cat was killed by my neighbor.’ 
  
        b. You   yi-zhi     mao,  bei        wode linju         sha-le. 
             have one-CL  cat      Passive my    neighbor  kill-Perf 
  ‘A cat was killed by my neighbor.’ 
 
The proper translation for the English example in (32) requires for the indefinite yige 
beizi ‘a glass’ to be introduced by you ‘have’ as shown in (35): 
 
 (35) Zuowan    you   yige beizi   po-le.  Nage beizi hen   gui. 
         last night  have one  glass   broke  that    glass very expensive 
         ‘A wine glass broke last night. The glass had been very expensive.’ 
   
                                                 
17  In generic sentences, however, an indefinite yi-NP ‘one-NP’ can occur in the subject position without 
the existential you ‘have’: 
 
(i) Yi-zhi qiangwa si-tiao    tui. 
a   CL frog        four-CL leg 
‘A frog has four legs. 
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Once introduced, yige beizi ‘a glass’ can be picked up by the definite description nage 
beizi ‘that glass’ that has the relevant property.18  In (35), the definite NP nage beizi ‘that 
glass’ in the second clause refers to the glass that broke last night.  In this sense, it picks 
up an old referent.  An indefinite NP cannot serve the same purpose:  
 
 (35’) # Zuowan    you   yige beizi   po-le.  Yige  beizi hen   gui. 
last night  have  one  glass   broke   one   glass very expensive 
            ‘#A wine glass broke last night. A glass had been very expensive. 
 
Like definites and unlike indefinites, wh-words in bare conditionals are able to pick up 
familiar discourse referents: 
 
(36) A: You   yiwei xuesheng shangxueqi    na  manfen,     
       have  one    student     last semester get perfect score  
       rang ta    dang banzhang     haoma? 
       let    him be     class-leader okay 
There was a student who got a perfect score last semester, let him be 
the class-leader all right?’ 
   
  B: Shei shang xueqi      na    manfen, 
       who last     semester get  perfect score 
       jiu    rang shei/ta  dang  banzhang. 
       then let    who/he serve leader      
       ‘Whoever received a perfect score last semester, let him be our class- 
         leader.’ 
 
                                                 
18  Chinese lacks a definite article that has the same function as the English the.  A definite NP in Chinese 
indicates reference as in zhege ren ‘this man’ or nage ren ‘that person’. 
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Previous analyses which treat wh-words as indefinites in bare conditionals would predict 
that wh-words in bare conditionals cannot be associated with a familiar referent.  This 
prediction is not fulfilled as we witness in (36B), the anteceding wh-phrase and its 
anaphoric element pick up a familiar referent--the student who got the perfect score. 
 Lin (1996) regards the bare conditional in (36B) (a modification of (19b)) as 
“one-case” bare conditional for being able to admit a consequent pronoun.  He argues 
that bare conditionals that are compatible with a pronoun such as (36B) must be singled 
out from Cheng and Huang’s “multi-case” bare conditionals that prohibit the presence of 
a pronoun such as (37) (their translation unaltered):19 
 
(37) Shei   xian   lai,      shei/*ta      (jiu)   xian  chi. 
                    who   first   come,  who/(s)he   then  first   eat  
                    ‘Whoever comes in first eats first.’ 
 
Lin claims that one-case examples such as (36B) can admit a pronoun because there is an 
actual individual that satisfies the relevant description, while multi-case examples such as 
(37) prohibit a pronoun because (37) is about possible individuals.  He maintains the 
status of wh-words in (37) as indefinites.  However, in a similar context as the one we see 
in (38) in which a relevant individual is introduced to the discourse, even Cheng and 
Huang’s example in (37) can be felicitously used: 
                                                 
19 Note that the translation of this sentence provided in Cheng and Huang (1996) reads: If x comes first, x 
eats first.  I do not use their translation because it cannot distinguish bare conditionals from ruguo ‘if’-
conditionals.   
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 (38) A: You   yige ren       xian lai-le.             
   have  one  person first  come-Perf    
   ‘There is a man who arrived first.’  
 
        B: Shei   xian   lai,      shei (jiu)   xian  chi. 
                  who   first   come,  who then  first   eat  
                  ‘Whoever comes first, eats first.’ 
 
In (38), the anteceding wh-phrase and its anaphoric element in the bare conditional 
uttered by speaker B pick up an old discourse referent introduced by the indefinite yige 
ren ‘a person’ (38A).  This behavior of wh-words in bare conditionals cannot be 
predicted by the previous analyses that treat them as indefinites.  On the contrary, our 
account takes wh-words in bare conditionals as definites and can explain the behavior of 
wh-words in bare conditionals adequately.  It should be noted that Cheng and Huang’s 
(also Lin’s) translation of the bare conditional for (37) i.e., If x comes first, x eats first, is 
not appropriate in the context of (38).  In the previous section, we noted that a bare 
conditional cannot be adequately translated into a ruguo ‘if’-conditional.  In what follows 
we will look closely at the behavior of wh-words in these two constructions. 
 
2.1.5 Bare Conditionals ≠ Ruguo ‘if’-conditionals 
 Bare conditionals and ruguo ‘if’-conditionals are regarded as indistinguishable in 
meaning in previous studies.  However, once one starts observing the use of these two 
constructions in discourse, it becomes obvious that they are not at all similar.  In a 
context that supplies a relevant referent as seen in (36) and (38), the use of bare 
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conditionals is felicitous while the use of ruguo ‘if’-conditionals turns out to be rather 
odd, if not entirely unacceptable: 
  
 (39)  A: You   yiwei xuesheng shangxueqi    na  manfen,     
       have  one    student     last semester get perfect score  
       rang ta    dang banzhang     haoma? 
       let    him be     class-leader okay 
There was a student who got a perfect score last semester, let him be 
the class-leader all right?’ 
 
           ?B: Ruguo you    shei  shang xueqi      na  manfen,  
       if         have  who last     semester get perfect score   
       ta   zhe xueqi       jiu    keyi/bixu  dang  banzhang.   
       he  this semester  then  may/must serve leader      
      ‘If there was a student who received a perfect score last semester, he  
         can be our class-leader.’ 
 
In the context set up by (39A), an individual had a perfect score.  However, the ruguo 
‘if’-conditional in (39B) entertains the possibility of the existence of such an individual, 
and cannot be naturally used in this context without oddity and redundancy.  Contrast to 
the ruguo ‘if’-conditional in (39B), the use of a bare conditional is natural and felicitous 
in the same context that supplies a relevant referent: 
 
 (40) A: You   yiwei xuesheng shangxueqi    na  manfen,     
        have  one    student     last semester get perfect score  
   rang ta    dang banzhang     haoma? 
   let    him be     class-leader okay 
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‘There was a student who got a perfect score last semester, let him be the  
class-leader all right?’ 
 
           B: Shei  shang xueqi      na  manfen,  
     who  last    semester get perfect score   
     ta   zhe xueqi       jiu    keyi/bixu  dang  banzhang.   
     he  this semester  then  may/must serve leader      
     ‘Whoever received a perfect score last semester can be our class-leader.’ 
 
Again, we see that antecedent wh-phrases in a bare conditional are able to pick up old 
discourse referents supplied by the discourse context.  In (40B) the antecedent wh-phrase 
picks up the familiar referent, i.e., the student who got a perfect score last semester.  
Definite NPs are known to pick out contextually salient entities that are known to 
conversational participants.  This cannot be predicted under previous accounts that treat 
wh-words in a bare conditional as indefinites.   
 Here we observe that ruguo ‘if’-conditionals require a context that does not make 
known a relevant individual with the relevant property, while this does not need to be the 
case with bare conditionals.  These two constructions clearly display very different 
semantic properties that cannot be captured by previous analyses that treat them as the 
same.     
   
2.2 Quantification in Bare Conditionals 
 This section argues that wh-words/pronoun in bare conditionals can be uniformly 
analyzed as definite descriptions that denote the unique maximal plural entity in the sense 
of Jacobson (1995). 
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2.2.1 Pronouns in Bare Conditionals ≠ Russellian Definites  
 Lin (1996) claims that a pronoun in a bare conditional is only possible if there is a 
unique individual that satisfies the relevant description in the actual world.  His idea is 
inspired by Bertrand Russell’s analysis of definite descriptions.  
 According to Russell (1905), definite descriptions carry a uniqueness implication 
which separates them from indefinites.  In order for an utterance containing a definite 
description to be true, there must be one and only one individual which satisfies the 
descriptive content of the definite NP in the actual world.  Russell’s semantics of definite 
description asserts both uniqueness and existence.  Consider the sentence in (41a) below: 
 
 (41) a. The King of France is bald. 
         b.∃x (King of France (x) & ∀y (King of France (y) → y= x) & Bald (x)) 
 
In Russell’s analysis, for (41a) to be true, the following propositions must be true: (i) 
there is a King of France (existential commitment), (ii) there is only one King of France 
(uniqueness requirement), and (iii) he is bald.  If any of these are false, then the whole 
proposition is false.  The definite article the acts like a quantifier with a uniqueness 
qualification.  With Russell’s analysis of definite descriptions in mind, Lin claims that a 
pronoun, being also a definite description itself, is only felicitous in a bare conditional if 
it can refer to an actual unique individual that satisfies the description of the bare 
conditional.  To quote the author’s words, “when the anaphoric wh-phrase is replaced by 
a pronoun, the antecedent wh-phrase must refer to a unique referent” and “the “more than 
one person reading disappears” (1996, p. 250).  But, as we will discuss below, this idea 
about the felicitous use of Chinese pronouns is incorrect.    
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 According to Lin, multi-case and one-case bare conditionals differ with respect to 
their compatibility with a consequent pronoun.  Multi-case examples allow multiple 
possible individuals to satisfy the relevant description but one-case examples require that 
a unique individual has the relevant property in the actual world.  For multi-case bare 
conditionals with two identical wh-words, Lin employs an unselective binding analysis to 
prevent hindering the traditional treatment of wh-words as indefinites.  For one-case bare 
conditionals with a consequent pronoun, he suggests three possible approaches to account 
for the uniqueness and existence requirement imposed by the presence of the pronoun.  In 
sum, Lin avoids treating wh-words in bare conditionals as definites and is forced to posit 
different analyses for a single construction. 
 So far, we have gathered a number of examples to show that wh-words in bare 
conditionals are definites regardless of the presence of a consequent pronoun.  Moreover, 
a pronoun in bare conditionals does not always have an actual referent as shown in (42):   
      
 (42) Genju        xuixiao   de    guiding, shei   shangxueqi     na    di-yi-ming, 
         according  school    DE   rule        who   last semester  get   top-one  
                    ta/shei   zhexueqi         jiu      keyi   dang   banzhang.   
         he/who  this semester  then   can    serve   leader          
         ‘(According to the rule of the school) whoever had the best score last   
          semester can serve as the class leader this semester. 
 
As a generic statement, the pronoun in (42) does not have an antecedent that refers to an 
actual single unique individual.  I believe that we can treat the first wh-phrase and its 
anaphoric element (a pronoun or a wh-word) in a bare conditional uniformly as a definite 
description similar to Jacobson (1995) for English FRs.  It is important to emphasize that 
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although one of Lin’s analyses for bare conditionals with a consequent pronoun is also 
inspired by that analysis, my account will differ from Lin’s in two respects: (i) under my 
account the first wh-phrase and any anaphoric element in a bare conditional will 
uniformly be analyzed as definites, while Lin adopts Jacobson’s analysis only as a 
suggestion for analyzing bare conditionals with a consequent pronoun; (ii) according to 
Lin, a pronoun in a bare conditional as a definite description requires the existence of a 
unique relevant individual, while my notion of definites does not commit to existence.   
 
2.2.2 Quantification of English Sentences with FRs-ever  
A great number of works observe that free relatives in English behave like 
definite descriptions.20  The most obvious evidence comes from the fact that FRs with or 
without -ever have interpretations paraphrasable by definites or universals (Jacobson 
1995; Dayal 1997): 
 
 (43) a. I ordered what he ordered for dessert. (= the thing he ordered for dessert) 
         b. Do what the baby sitter tells you. (= everything the babysitter tells you) 
         c. John will read whatever Bill assigns (= everything Bill assigns) 
 
Jacobson (1995), in particular, made an important observation that even when an FR can 
be paraphrased as a universal, a definite plural captures its meaning just as well:  
 
(44) Do what (= the stuff/the thing/the things) the baby sitter tells you. 
                                                 
20 Works that consider English FRs to have the semantics of definites include Jesperson 1927, Jacobson 
1995, Rullman 1995, Grosu & Landman 1998, Von Fintel 2000, Tredinnick 2005, etc.  Note that there are 
other accounts that treat FRs-ever as indefinites (cf. Wiltschko 1998), but I will not consider those analyses 
here. 
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Her idea is that the apparent exhaustive interpretation of FRs is a reflection of their 
maximality.  For instance, in (45a) beans, rice, and tacos is an exhaustive 
characterization of the things on my plate while the set of individuals that are on my plate 
in (45b) does not need to be exhaustive (p. 471): 
 
 (45) a. What is on my plate are beans, rice and tacos. 
         b. Beans, rice and tacos are on my plate, 
 
Jacobson provides a unified analysis for FRs that allows for both singular definite and 
universal-like readings.  She proposes to treat an FR as a definite description denoting a 
maximal plural entity.  A maximal plural entity is an entity with the property P which is 
composed of all other entities with property P.  Such an entity can be seen as a special 
kind of individual (cf. Link 1983).  A plural entity includes the atomic (singular) entities 
as well as the properly plural entities.  If there is only one atomic individual with a given 
property in a given domain, then the maximal plural entity with that property is the one 
consisting of just this atomic individual.  In (45a), what is on my plate is a predicate true 
of only one thing: the maximal plural entity whose parts are all on my plate.   
 Following Cooper (1983), Jacobson takes all WH-constituents to denote sets of 
individuals.  An ordinary relative clause like what John ordered denotes the set of all 
individuals that John ordered: 
 
 (46) what John ordered’= λX[ordered’ (X) (j) &∀Y(ordered’ (Y) (j) → Y≤ X)]21 
                                                 
21  Jacobson’s idea can be traced back to Sharvy (1980).  ‘Y ≤ X’ reads as ‘Y is included in X’.  Jacobson 
explains that any two plural entities a and b may be joined to form another plural entity c.  If c = a + b, then 
a is included in c (written a ≤ c) (Jacobson 1995, p. 472).   
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The idea is that what John ordered characterizes the set of maximal plural entities that 
John ordered including both the atoms and the null set.  Such a set is guaranteed to be a 
singleton which may be an atom or the null set.  The meaning of this FR in (46), a 
predicative expression, is shifted to have the meaning of a NP via the iota type shifting 
rule proposed in Partee (1987).22  Applying this operation, we map a property onto the 
unique individual having that property.  Thus, the shifted FR denotes the single 
individual characterized by the predicate--the maximal plural entity that John ordered.  
This entity can be singular (= the thing that John ordered), or plural (= the sum of all the 
things that John ordered).  The denotation of the FR what John ordered is of type <e> 
translated as follows: 
 
 (47) [NPwhat John ordered]’= ιX [ordered’(X)(j) &∀Y(ordered’(Y)(j) → Y ≤ X) ] 
 
The shifted constituent what John ordered has the meaning of a NP.  It denotes the 
unique maximal individual, the maximal plural entity that John ordered.  If John ordered 
only one thing, then this NP will have the meaning of a singular definite.  If John ordered 
more than one thing, then the NP will denote the single entity consists of all other entities 
that John ordered and so will be like a universal (p. 468).  Under Jacobson’s analysis, 
definites are a kind of universal.  The universal force comes from the fact that an FR 
denotes a complex individual that is composed of all atoms with the relevant property.  
The constituent, what John ordered, is a predicate true of only one thing: the maximal 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
22  This will be mentioned again in Section 2.2.4.  
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plural entity that John ordered.  The universal force of FRs comes from their exhaustive 
characterization of the things that John ordered. 
 It is important to point out that Jacobson’s analysis allows the null set to be a 
plural entity.  Even if no atomic entity satisfies the FR constituent in the actual world, the 
FR will still be true of the null set.  This accounts for examples such as the following 
where the FR does not entail existence (Jacobson’s (59)):  
 
 (48) I read (exactly) what was on the reading list—namely nothing at all. 
 
However, Jacobson admits that in some cases, an FR seems to strongly suggest the 
existence of something with the relevant property shown below (her (58a)): 
  
 (49) Whoever handed in the assignment late failed. 
 
She notes that perhaps it is the context which determines the domain of atoms out of 
which is composed the plural entity.  In contexts where an FR requires existence as with 
the example in (49), then we say that the null set is not included in the domain.  Or, we 
may say, as pointed out to me by David Beaver (p.c.), that the existence implication 
arises with the meaning of certain verbs.  For instance, the following FR seems to entail 
existence:   
 
 (50) ??What John bought is sitting here on the table--namely nothing at all. 
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It is rather strange to allow the FR constituent what John bought to be true of a null set.  
Examples such as (48) and (50) may be acceptable when used sarcastically (see also 
Tredinnick 2005, p. 29).  At this point, I am unable to address what exactly is responsible 
for the existence implication associated with FRs.  In any case, it should be quite 
uncontroversial that FRs do not assert existence when they occur in sentences describing 
events that have not yet occurred: 
 
 (51) Tomorrow, whoever arrives here first will receive a nice present. 
 
Since Strawson (1950), many continue to observe that definite descriptions do not assert 
existence.  For instance, the examples in (52) are felicitous in a context where the White 
Whale is not sighted (cf. Donnellan 1966; Cheng and Giannakidou 2006):23  
 
 (52) a. This golden coin belongs to the sailor that sights the White Whale. 
         b. This golden coin belongs to whichever sailor sights the White Whale. 
 
In Roberts (2003), the analysis of definite descriptions is also based on the observation 
that the existence and uniqueness in question are not about referents in the actual world, 
not entailed as Russell had it. 24   It appears that existence can be dispensed with 
morphological definites.  For this reason, I take the iota operator to be a maximality 
operator, not necessarily committed to existence just like in Jacobson’s analysis. 
 
                                                 
23 The idea here is that definite descriptions can be used attributively rather than referentially. 
24 Rather, they are about discourse referents in the common ground of the interlocutors. 
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2.2.3 Are Wh-phrases in Bare Conditionals mei-NPs ‘every-NPs’? 
 It is a commonly held view that wh-phrases in bare conditionals are universally 
quantified expressions equivalent to the mei ‘every’-NPs.  However, a bare conditional is 
not always suitable for a paraphrase using mei ‘every’-NPs.  In some cases, wh-phrases in 
a bare conditional demand a paraphrase using a singular definite.  In other cases where a 
bare conditional has an apparent universal-like reading, substituting the universal with a 
plural definite does the job just as well.  For instance, while the bare conditional in (53a) 
can be paraphrased using a universal or a plural definite as shown in (53b), the bare 
conditional in (54a) clearly prefers a paraphrase using a singular definite shown in (54b):    
 
 (53) a. Natian    didi               henguai,    
             that day little brother very well-behaved 
                       [mama shou shenme,   ta  jiu   zuo shenme]Bare Conditional.25 
                      mother say  what        he then do  what        
            ‘That day little brother was very well-behaved.  He did whatever his 
                        mother said.’ 
 
      = b. Mama  shou de   mei-jian   shi/naxie shi,          ta dou zuo. 
                      mother say   Rel  every-CL thing/those things  he all   do 
             ‘He did everything/those things that his mother said.’ 
 
 (54) a. Li  xiaojie hen   xiang jiaren,          bu   zaiyi jiagei shei. 
  Li  miss    very  want  get married  not care  marry who 
  shuo [shei shuo ta    piaoliang, ta    jiu    jiagei shei/ta]Bare Conditional. 
    say    who say   she  pretty        she then marry who/he    
   ‘Miss Li wants to get married very badly and does not care whom she  
              will marry. She said that she will marry whoever says she is pretty.’  
                                                 
25  Chinese poses restrictions on the occurrence of inanimate ta ‘it’ in object position.   
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      = b. Li  xiaojie hui   jiage  nage/ ?naxie/ ??meige  shuo ta   piaoliang DE  ren. 
  Li  miss     will  marry that-CL/those/every    say   she pretty       Rel man 
  ‘Miss Li will marry the man/?those men who say(s) that she is pretty.’ 
        
Considering that Miss Li cannot marry everyone who says that she is pretty in the society 
we live in, (54a) is better paraphrased with a singular definite nage shuo ta piaoliang DE 
ren ‘the man who says that she is pretty’.  In cases where wh-phrases are anaphoric to a 
specific definite NP, using a universal mei ‘every’-NP to paraphrase a bare conditional 
becomes inappropriate: 
 
(55) A: Ni    gen wo laopuo shuo-le shenme?  Ta   hen   shengqi. 
  you with my wife    say-LE what         she  very  angry 
           ‘What did you tell my wife?  She is very angry.’ 
 
 Shi bu  shi gen   wo zuo de   na-jian   shi     you   guan? 
 be  not be  with  I     do  Rel  that-CL thing  have relevance 
 ‘Does it or does it not have something to do with the thing that I did?’  
 
        B: [Ni   zuo shenme wo jiu    shuo shenme] Bare Conditional. Guai   niziji      ba.  
            you  do  what      I     then say   what           blame yourself BA 
             ‘I told her whatever you did (not the ellipsis reading). Blame yourself.’  
   
      =B’: Wo  ba   ni     zuo de      najian    shi/??meijian shi   dou  gaosu ta.    
   I      BA you  do   REL  that-CL thing/everything    all    tell     her 
               ‘I told her the thing/everything that you did.’ 
 
The bare conditional in (55B) paraphrased with meijian shi ‘everything’ is inadequate as 
shown in (55B’), since the anteceding wh-phrase and its anaphoric wh-word clearly refer 
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to the thing that speaker A has done.  The identity of the thing that speaker B said to 
speaker A’s wife explicitly associates with a definite expression in the context of (55).   
 
2.2.4 A Unified Treatment of Wh-words in Bare Conditionals 
I believe we can capture the quantification in bare conditionals by borrowing the 
key ideas of Jacobson (1995).  We may say that a Chinese wh-constituent as in English 
can characterize a set of individuals and then is shifted down to denote the single 
individual characterized by the predicate--the maximal plural entity that satisfies the 
description of the wh-constituent.  According to Partee (1987), the way for a property to 
map into an individual is by what she calls the iota type-shifting rule.  This operation 
maps a property onto one and only one individual.  In this way, a predicative expression 
is shifted into an individual-denoting expression just in case the set characterized by the 
predicate is a singleton.  Since a free relative characterizes a set which is guaranteed to be 
a singleton (as mentioned in Section 2.2.2 following Jacobson’s analysis), it will always 
be shifted down to denote an individual.  To reiterate this, we say that a free relative 
starts out as a predicative expression of type <e, t> (shown in (46)) and then is shifted 
down to denote an individual of type <e> (shown in (47)).  Although Jacobson treats FRs 
as predicative expressions that type-shift to NP meaning, some do not take that extra 
type-shifting step but assume that FRs directly contributes a maximality operator to the 
semantics (cf. Rullmann 1995; Tredinnick 2005).  In those approaches, the FR what John 
ordered is equivalent to the iota expression shown in (56): 
  
(56) ιx [ordered (x)(j) &∀y(ordered (y)(j) → y ≤ x) ] 
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Suppose that we also do not take that extra type-shifting step and translate the first 
wh-clause directly into ιx.P(x), where x is the maximal plural entity x such that x has the 
property of P and the expression is denoted by the first wh-clause.  Here the iota operator 
is used for both singulars and plurals and is also used as a maximality operator.  The first 
wh-clause and its anaphoric element (which can be either a second occurrence of the 
same wh-word or a pronoun) of a bare conditional can be treated as a definite description.  
The bare conditional (54a) will then have the structure in (57a) and the expression formed 
by the first wh-clause, and together with its anaphoric element (be it a second wh-word or 
a pronoun) will denote (57b): 
 
 (57) a. [CP shei   shuo  Li xiaojie  piaoliang]i [IP ta    jiu     jiagei  shei i /ta i] 
                   who  say     Miss Li      pretty              she then  marry  who/he 
  
       b. ιx [say Miss Li is pretty (x) &∀y(say Miss Li is pretty (y) → y ≤ x)]  
 
The first wh-clause and together with its anaphoric element are interpreted as the unique 
x such that x has the property of say Miss Li is pretty.  The definite wh-expression ιx.P(x) 
in the case of (54a) is an atomic entity, a singular definite.  Alternatively, ιx.P(x) can be 
an entity that consists of more than one atom and so it will be like a plural definite 
deriving a universal-like reading as in (53a).  
 The question now becomes how the pronoun/wh-word in the second clause is 
linked to the first wh-clause.  We have said that a bare conditional is ambiguous between 
a singular definite and a plural definite (universal) reading.  The first clause is a definite 
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expression ιx. P(x). 26   This iota expression can pick up either a unique singular (a 
singular definite reading) or a unique plural individual (a universal reading).  So far, 
Jacobson’s analysis works well in explaining the quantification in bare conditionals.  We 
can consider that in a bare conditional the first clause is an iota expression and that the 
anaphoric wh-word (or a pronoun or an empty pronoun) in the second clause receives a 




                                                
(58) a. Shei  shuo Li xiaojie piaoliang, shei daomei. 
who  said  Miss Li    pretty       who unlucky 
‘Whoever said Miss Li is pretty will be/is unlucky.’ 
 
         b. 
 
                         IP  unlucky (ιx (said Li pretty (x)))   
            λy. unlucky (y)  
       i    
     CP  ιx (said Li pretty (x))    IP   unlucky (i)  
                       
     NP  t i     VP  λy. y is unlucky 
 
who said Li pretty     who i        unlucky          
 
 
In (58b), the first clause is an iota expression that has been raised and the wh-
word/pronoun/empty pronoun in the second clause will be its trace.  We get the effect of 
 
26 Note that this is also consistent with von Fintel’s analysis (2000) in which an –ever phrase is interpreted 
as ιx. P(x). 
27 This is similar to the bound-variable treatment for the pronoun in John hates his father discussed in Heim 
and Kratzer (1998) in that John is quantifier raised and the pronoun carries the same index as the trace of 
John.  I thank David Beaver for the discussion here.  All faults are mine. 
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bound variable reading with the adjoined index being the variable binder that performs 
predicate/lambda abstraction.  The denotation of the wh-word in the second clause varies 
in different contexts with different assignments.  The whole sentence gets the meaning of 
“unlucky (ιx (say Li pretty (x)).” 
 It is important to note that ιx.P(x) denoted by the wh-constituent and its anaphoric 
element in a bare conditional does not commit to existence just like in Jacobson’s 
analysis for English FRs.  In (54a) (also (57a)), even if there is no individual in the actual 
world who said Miss Li is pretty, the first wh-constituent and its anaphoric element will 
still be suitable for a paraphrase that takes the form nei-NP ‘that-NP’ referring to some 
hypothetical individual.  This is to say that the first wh-constituent and its anaphoric 
element can be used to signal definiteness.  Provided we take definite NPs in Chinese to 
be phrases of the form nei-NP ‘that-NP’ or zhe-NP ‘this-NP’ (Section 2.1), the first wh-
constituent and its anaphoric element in a bare conditional will be definite even if no 
individual satisfies relevant descriptions in the actual world.   
 In Chapter 3 (Section 3.4.3) we will show that using relative clauses with a 
relativizer is not the most productive strategy for modifying nouns in Chinese.  It will 
become clear that in the absence of a relativizer, the first clause of a bare conditional 
nevertheless has the meaning of a relativized NP.  Chapter 3 will also show that bare 
conditionals differ from English FRs with respect to their structures and their default 
modal flavors.  Then, in chapter 4, we will discuss the theoretical consequences of 
treating the pronoun ta ‘he/she’ in bare conditionals as a bound variable.   
 
2.3 Predictions and Implications of the Present Account 
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This section discusses some advantages of the present account.  First, wh-phrases 
used as anaphoric definites that previous accounts posited to be non-existing are found in 
naturally occurring data.  Such uses of wh-phrases are completely predictable under our 
present account.  Another advantage of the account proposed here is the implication it 
bares for the study of the distribution of wh-phrases in Chinese. 
       
2.3.1 Wh-phrases as Anaphoric Definites in Naturally Occurring Examples 
 Previous analyses of wh-words in bare conditionals as indefinites bound by a 
universal-like operator are grounded on the firm belief that wh-phrases cannot be definite 
(Cheng and Huang 1996; Lin 1996).  Lin (1996) ponders from which I quote liberally: “It 
is impossible to use another wh-phrase to refer back to the antecedent wh-phrase.  This 
strongly indicates that wh-phrases cannot be used as anaphoric definite NPs.”  Consider 
the example he provides (p. 237): 
 
(59) A: Dagai      shi shei you   rer      laoshi   shengqi le. 
              Probably be who again make teacher angry    PAR 
  ‘Probably somebody made the teacher angry again.’ 
   
         B: Wo kan bacheng na-ge     ren/*shei    shi Wang Da-zhong. 
              I     see  80%       that-CL man/who    be  Wang Da-zhong 
             ‘I guess that that person is probably Wang Da-zhong.’ 
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Lin explicates that in (59A), the wh-phrase is an existential polarity item meaning 
someone/somebody.28  The referent denoted by that wh-phrase is referred back by a 
definite NP such as na-ge ren ‘that person’ as in (59B) but it is not possible to use 
another wh-phrase to refer back to the antecedent wh-phrase.  From this Lin concludes 
that wh-phrases in Chinese cannot be used as anaphoric definite NPs. 
 What is missing in Lin’s discussion is the fact that wh-phrases in Chinese CAN be 
anaphoric definites.  A wh-phrase in Chinese can be seen used as an anaphoric definite 
NP typically in contexts where the identity of its referent is unknown to a speaker.29  A 
modification of Lin’s example in (59) above illustrates this point:   
 
 (60) A: Dagai      shi shei   you   rer      laoshi   shengqi le. 
   Probably be  who  again make teacher angry     PAR 
  ‘Probably somebody made the teacher angry again.’ 
   
       B: Wo kan bacheng shi na-ge     ren/shei, wo wang-le    tade mingzi. 
  I      see 80%       be  that-CL ren/who, I    forgot-LE his   name 
  ‘I guess it’s probably that person, I forgot his name.’ 
 
In (59) it is impossible to use another wh-phrase to refer back to the antecedent wh-phrase 
because the identity of the referent of the definite wh-phrase is revealed as Wang Da-
zhong.  Contrary to (59B), the identity of the referent expressed by the wh-phrase is 
unknown in (60B) and the use of a wh-phrase as an anaphoric definite NP is felicitous.   
                                                 
28 The various interpretations of wh-words as non-interrogative existential indefinites are discussed in 
Chapter One of this dissertation (Section 1.4). 
 
29 Sometimes an anaphoric definite wh-phrase is used by a speaker when she does in fact know the identity 
of its referent but is not revealing it.  
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 Let us term this use of wh-phrases as anaphoric definite NPs “the ignorance use of 
wh-words” just like the way von Fintel (2000) discusses ignorance FRs with -ever.  When 
a speaker has a person in mind but is unable to properly identify the name of that person, 
she may use shei ‘who’ to signal just that:  
 
 (61) Ni   xihuan DE neige  shei,   gancai       dadianhua lai-le. 
  you like      DE that     who   minute ago call            come-Perf 
        ‘Whoever you like called a minute ago.’ 
 
Likewise, in (62) below, the use of shei ‘who’ is judged by native speakers as an 
indicator of a speaker’s inability to utter the person’s name for whatever reason: 
 
 (62) Yuna xiang gen  neige shei  shuohua, keshi shei  you  bu  li         ta.30 
             Yuna want  with that    who talk         but     who then not bother her 
         ‘Whoever Yuna wanted to talk, he didn’t want to pay attention to her.’ 
 
In (61), shei ‘who’ is preceded by the determiner neige ‘that-CL’ but no determiner 
precedes shei ‘who’ in (62).  In these examples, shei ‘who’ and neige shei ‘that-CL who’ 
are used to signal that the speaker does not know or cannot identify the individual in 
question.  Below are more naturally occurring examples of the ignorance use of wh-
phrases: 
 
                                                 
30  I overheard this example from the conversation between two native speakers of Mandarin.  This 
utterance is produced by Yijing Lai in Winter 2007. 
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 (63) a. Tingshuo guo   le      wo shi na-ge     shei de               nuer, 
  hear         Perf  ASP  I    be  that-CL who Possessive  daughter 
  xianzai wo yizhuang bitingde zuo zai zheli, ni    hai   jide          wo ma?31 
  now       I    cloth        straight  sit   at   here  you still  remember I   MA 
            ‘You have heard that I am that person’s daughter, now I am sitting here in  
  suit and tie.  Do you still remember me?’ 
 
         b. Wo  ganggang     zai    xi       yifu,      Nagoya wen wo: 
              I      minute ago  Prog wash  clothes  Nagoya  ask  I 
             “Na-ge     shei jiao shenme mingzi ya?”  
               that-CL  who call what      name   YA 
              Wo gaosu ta:        “wo buzhidao  na-ge     shei  jiao shenme  mingzi”32  
              I     tell     he/she    I    not know  that-CL who  call  what      name 
              ‘A minute ago I was washing clothes, Nagoya asked me: “what’s that  
    person’s name?” I told her: “I don’t know what that person’s name is.”’ 
 
Other examples of wh-phrases/words in CBCs besides shei ‘who’ and shenme ‘what’ as 
anaphoric definite NPs are added as follows: 
 
(64) A: Ni    qu  nail? 
  you  go  where 
  ‘Where did you go?’ 
 
       B: Ni     qu  nali,    wo  jiu    qu nali/nali.33 
             you  go  where  I     then  go where/there  
  ‘I went wherever you went.’ 
  
                                                 
31 http://blog.roodo.com/licheno/archives/7325539.html 
32 http://mypaper.pchome.com.tw/jenniferjeng/post/1320399507/ 
33 When nali ‘where’ is pronounced with the forth tone on na, it means that place. 
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(65) A: Ni    bu  gai       he     zheme zui! 
 you  not should drink this     drunk 
 ‘You shouldn’t get so drunk!’ 
  
       B: Wo shenmeshiho xiang hejiu, wo jiu   shenmeshiho/nageshihou hejiu. 
   I     when             want  drink  I     then when/that time                 drink  
  ‘I drank whenever I felt like.’ 
 
(66) A: Ni    zenme zuo de?  
   We  how    do   DE 
  ‘How did you do it?’ 
 
                  B: Ni   zenme shuo, wo jiu   zenme/nayang   zuo. 
            you how    say     I   then how/that way      do 
  ‘I did however you said to do.’ 
 
Although Lin does not find any independent evidence to show that wh-
phrases/words can be anaphoric definites, we have naturally occurring examples to prove 
that wh-phrases/words can in fact be anaphoric definites.  Under our present analysis, the 
use of wh-phrases/words as anaphoric definite NPs is completely predictable. 
 
2.3.2 An Implication for the Study of Wh-phrases and Bare Nouns in Chinese 
 Non-interrogative existential wh-phrases in Chinese such as shei ‘who’ and 
shenme ‘what’ may receive an interpretation meaning somebody and something.  They 
typically occur in environments such as negation, questions, if-clauses, etc. as shown in 
(67a-c) respectively (cf. Huang 1982; Cheng 1991, 1994; Li 1992; Lin 1998): 
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 (67) a. Mei you  shei yuanyi bang ta. 
not have who willing help him 
‘There is nobody who is willing to help him.’ 
 
         b. Shei you    qifu   ni    le    ma?  (Yes-no Question) 
who again bully  you Asp Q 
‘Did somebody bully you again?’  
  
         c. Ruguo ni    you    shenme haochi de   dongxi, . . . 
if         you have  what      tasty    DE thing 
‘If you have something good to eat, . . .’ 
 
In addition, non-interrogative existential wh-phrases may also appear in modality 
environments or “some sort of future environments” (cf. Lin 1998): 
 
 (68) a. Keneng/xiangbi              shei you    qifu   ta     le 
possibly/most probably who again  bully him Asp 
‘Possibly/most probably, somebody bullied him again.’ 
 
        b. Wo mingtian  hui  qu mai  ge   shenme dongxi song  ta    de 
 I    tomorrow will go buy  CL what      thing   give   him Par 
‘I will go to buy something for him.’ 
 
Although the range of environments where existential wh-phrases can be found is quite 
wide, Lin (1998) claims that their distribution can be described with the following 
generalization (his (34), where EPW stands for Existential Polarity Wh-phrases): 
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(69) Non-Entailment-of-Existence Condition on Existential Polarity Wh-phrases: 
The use of an EPW is felicitous iff the proposition in which the EPW 
appears does not entail existence of a referent satisfying the description of 
the EPW. 
 
While (69) predicts well that existential wh-phrases can be found in the environments 
listed in (67-68), it cannot cover the distribution of wh-phrases in bare conditionals.  
When used as a statement to describe a fact, a bare conditional may suggest the existence 
of some individual satisfying the description of the conjuncts as shown in (40B), (53a), 
and (55B), for instance.  This is exactly what his generalization in (69) does not permit.  
Being aware of this fact, Lin concludes that “indefinite” wh-phrases in bare conditionals 
and existential wh-phrases might not be of the same kind.  So the nature of wh-phrases in 
bare conditionals remained a mystery.   
What has not been formally acknowledged in the literature is the use of non-
interrogative definite wh-phrases such as those discussed in Section 2.2.4.  If we convince 
ourselves that non-interrogative wh-phrases can be definites in bare conditionals 
(meaning the thing(s) or the person(s), etc.) or indefinites in the environments listed in 
(67-68) (meaning something, someone, etc.), then we no longer expect (69) to be able to 
cover wh-phrases in bare conditionals.  For (69) is made based solely on the distribution 
of indefinite wh-phrases.  If any generalization is to be made, it must be made while 
keeping in mind that non-interrogative wh-phrases may also be definites.   
Given that a question sentence is formed by replacing ordinary NPs with question 
words, it is reasonable to assume that wh-phrases such as shenme ‘what’, shei ‘who’ and 
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nali ‘where’ are pro-forms of ordinary NPs (Li and Thompson 1981; Lin 1999). 34  
Consider again question sentences in Chinese (15) repeated here below in (70-71): 
 
(70) Question: Ni   qing   shei chi fan? 
             you invite who eat food 
            ‘Whom did you invite to eat?’ 
 
       Answer: Wo qing     Zhangsan chi fan. 
           I     invite   Zhangsan eat food 
           ‘I invite Zhangsan to eat.’ 
 
(71) Question: Ni    zai    chi  shenme? 
             you  Prog  eat  what 
             ‘What are you eating?’ 
 
      Answer: Wo zai    chi  xiangjiao.  
          I     Prog eat  banana 
         ‘I am eating a banana.’ 
 
If we assume that wh-phrases are pro-forms of ordinary NPs, then the fact that wh-
phrases such as shenme ‘what’ and shei ‘who’ may have indefinite or definite 
interpretation depending on context will come at no surprise.  A number of recent studies 
suggest that bare NPs in Chinese can receive either an indefinite or a definite 
interpretation depending on pragmatic factors.  For instance, Yang (2001) shows that in a 
                                                 
34  Lin (1999) still regards Mandarin wh-phrases as indefinites, although that study attempts to account for 
the double-quantification phenomenon exhibited by bare conditionals by assimilating shenme ‘what’ to 
kind-denoting NPs which are definites.  Note that Lin evokes Krifka (1995) to support his claim that 
Mandarin bare NPs are kind-denoting predicates just like English bare NPs.  However, some refute the 
view that English bare NPs are kind-denoting (see Krifka 2004 for an overview of those approaches).       
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context where it is pragmatically odd, the indefinite reading of bare NPs “peeks out” as 
the only possible interpretation as shown in the following example: 
 
 (72) Gou zai meigeren-de   houyuan-li         jiao. 
         dog  at   everyone-DE backyard-inside bark 
        ‘Dogs are barking in everyone’s backyard.’ 
        #’The dog is barking in everyone’s backyard.’ 
 
Given that it is pragmatically unsound that a particular dog can be barking in everyone’s 
backyard, the definite reading of gou ‘the dog’ is excluded.  In the following examples 
the bare NP gou ‘dog’ and jingcha ‘police’ can also have either a definite or an indefinite 
interpretation (p. 31): 
 
 (73) Waimian/Yuanchu  gou zai-jiao. 
          Outside   far-away dog be-barking 
          ‘Outside, dogs/the dog(s) are/is barking.’ 
 
 (74) Jintian jingcha zhua   ren   le. 
         today  cop       arrest  man Asp 
         ‘Today cops/the cop(s) arrested some people.’ 
 
Like ordinary bare NPs, wh-phrases may be indefinite or definite.  Wh-phrases may be 
indefinites and subject to a number of licensing conditions as discussed in the literature 
but clearly they may also exhibit properties of definites.  Wh-phrases are compatible with 
the existential marker you ‘have’ in ruguo ‘if’-conditionals as indefinite (27) (repeated 
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here in (75)) but not in bare conditionals where they pattern with definites in (25) 
(repeated here in (76)):  
 
 (75) Ruguo you   shei   xian  lai,       ta      (jiu)   xian  chi.  
         if         have who   first  come,  who   then  first  eat 
         ‘If someone comes first, he then can eat first.’  
 
(76) *You  shei   xian  lai,       shei   (jiu)   xian  chi. 
               have who   first  come,  who   then   first  eat  
                    ‘Whoever comes first, eats first.’ 
 
A bare NP also has the option of being preceded by the existential marker you ‘have’: 
 
(77) a. Jintian jingcha zhua    ren   le. 
             today cop        arrest  man Asp 
             ‘Today cops/the cop(s) arrested some people.’ 
 
       b. Jintian you   jingcha zhua    ren   le. 
            today   have cop       arrest   man Asp 
            ‘Today there were/was cops/a cop arrested some people.’ 
 
Bare NPs may also be preceded by a determiner such as nei-NP ‘that-NP’ and zhe-NP 
‘this-NP’ and receive a definite interpretation. 
At this point it seems safe for us to conclude that the puzzle behind the 
distribution of wh-phrases can be solved based on two assumptions: (i) wh-phrases such 
as shenme ‘what’ and shei ‘who’ are pro-forms of bare NPs; (ii) wh-phrases like bare NPs 
can receive either an indefinite or a definite interpretation depending on contexts.  Lin’s 
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generalization in (69) is a generalization for non-interrogative indefinite wh-phrases.  It is 
understandable that it will not cover non-interrogative definite wh-phrases. 
 
2.4 Conclusion 
In this chapter I argue that unlike indefinites that are known to pick up the 
quantificational force of whichever adverb of quantification they are in the scope of, wh-
words in bare conditionals do not have a QV-reading in the presence of quantificational 
adverbs.  In addition, wh-words in bare conditionals also possess the following properties 
of definites: (i) they cannot be preceded by the existential verb you ‘have’ unlike 
indefinite NPs; (ii) they are not subject to novelty condition while indefinites are; (iii) 
they can pick up old discourse referents, an ability exhibited by definites, not by 
indefinites.  I propose a unified treatment based on the analysis of Jacobson (1995) for 
English FRs (see also Srivastav 1991 for Hindi left-adjoined correlatives) to capture the 
quantificational force of wh-phrases in bare conditionals.  The anteceding wh-phrase and 
its anaphoric element, which may be a pronoun or a wh-word, are uniformly treated as 
definites denoting a maximal plural entity.  This maximal plural entity can be an atomic 
entity resulting in a singular definite reading.  Alternatively, it can be an entity that 
consists of more than one atom deriving a universal-like reading.  Previous accounts of 
wh-phrases do not consider the fact that wh-phrases can be definites and leave behind 
pieces of puzzles as a result.  The present account is able to predict the existence of 
anaphoric definite wh-phrases in naturally occurring data.  It also bears an implication for 
the study of the distribution of Chinese wh-phrases for being able to provide an 
explanation to the puzzle raised in Lin (1998). 
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Chapter 3  




 This chapter examines modal implications in Chinese Bare Conditionals, a topic 
that has not been discussed in previous accounts.  It draws comparison with English FRs-
ever.  Von Fintel (2000) argues that the morpheme -ever presupposes ignorance (not 
knowing) or indifference (not caring).35  The ignorance reading results from a variation 
over the denotation of the free relative across a speaker’s epistemic worlds and the 
indifference reading results from a variation over the denotation of the free relative across 
counterfactual worlds.  I show that like FRs-ever, Chinese Bare Conditionals may be 
used to signal ignorance and indifference.  However, unlike FRs-ever, Chinese Bare 
Conditionals necessarily force a causal interpretation of the conjuncts and always 
contribute an indifference presupposition which is also an entailment in the presence of a 
counterfactual mood.  In embedded contexts, the indifference reading enters the truth 
conditional content, while the ignorance reading of Chinese Bare Conditionals must be 
accommodated in the global context.  In the absence of a morpheme that functions to 
signal indifference, Chinese Bare Conditionals rely on the mechanism of common sense 
                                                 
35 The notion of “indifference” has several related meanings.  In von Fintel’s analysis, the “indifference” 
use of whatever mainly concerns an agent’s indifferent attitude.  It conveys a kind of indifference on the 
part of an agent signaling that he or she does not care.  In 3.4 we will discuss instances where whatever 
conveys “indifference” without reference to an agent’s/a speaker’s attitude.  This contrasts with the 
“indifference” use of bare conditionals which always implies an agent’s or a speaker’s indifference. 
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to derive a casual interpretation between two clauses that produces the indifference 
reading. 
 This chapter is structured as follows: Section 3.2 reviews the analysis of FRs-ever 
proposed in von Fintel (2000).  Then, it shows that modal implication of ignorance 
associated with whatever is not a classic case of presupposition, but an implicature that is 
accommodated when certain conditions for the use of whatever are met in the common 
ground.  Section 3.3 discusses modal implications in Chinese Bare Conditionals.  It 
argues that this construction always entails indifference due to the obligatory presence of 
a causal interpretation between two conjuncts.  Section 3.4 proposes to capture the 
agent’s/speaker’s indifference reading of bare conditionals with von Fintel’s semantics of 
whatever, but suggests that his analysis may not be well-suited for whatever after all.  
Then, it addresses the problem with translation between whatever-sentences and bare 
conditionals. 
 
3.2 Modal Implications of English FRs-ever 
 This section provides an overview of recent advancements in the study of the 
meaning of English FRs-ever focusing on their modal implications.  It takes the 
contribution of Dayal (1997) and von Fintel (2000) as the basis of the discussion, while it 
attempts to make clear the point that modal implication of ignorance associated with 
whatever is not a classic case of presupposition.  Rather, the implication of ignorance can 
only be accommodated when certain conditions for the use of whatever are met.   
 
3.2.1 Dayal (1997) and von Fintel (2000) 
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 FRs-ever are unlike their plain FRs counterpart because the morpheme -ever 
contributes an additional modal flavor to an utterance which otherwise is lacking with 
plain FRs without -ever.  Dayal (1997) takes the role of the morpheme -ever as an 
indicator of a speaker’s ignorance (see also Elliott 1971, Jacobson 1995, Dayal 1997, and 
among others).  The sentence in (78a) but not the one in (78b) can have the following 
paraphrase: “I don’t know what Arlo is cooking but the thing whatever it is that Arlo is 
cooking has a lot of garlic in it”: 
 
 (78) a. There’s a lot of garlic in whatever Arlo is cooking. 
         b. There’s a lot of garlic in what Arlo is cooking. 
 
The contrast between plain FRs and FRs-ever with respect to their association with a 
speaker’s ignorance is highlighted using the namely test: 
 
 (79) a. *Whatever Mary is cooking, namely ratatouille, uses onions. 
          b. What Mary is cooking, namely ratatouille, uses onions. 
 
According to Dayal, whatever asserts that the speaker cannot identify the referent of the 
FR that denotes the thing that Arlo is cooking.  Nevertheless, von Fintel (2000) notices 
that whatever does not always make an epistemic assertion.  In embedded contexts, 
whatever does not contribute “epistemic certainty to the assertion of the sentence” (p. 4): 
 
(80) Unless there’s a lot of garlic in whatever Arlo is cooking, I will eat out 
tonight. [≠ Unless I’m sure that there’s a lot of garlic in what Arlo is 
cooking, I will eat out tonight.] 
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It appears that there is no embedded epistemic assertion in (80) as von Fintel points out.  
Also, the “presupposition” of speaker ignorance as to the denotation of the FR projects to 
the matrix level (p.5).  This motivates von Fintel to assume a presupposition of ignorance 
as to the denotation of the FR, thus replacing Dayal’s “assertion of ignorance.”36  In 
addition, he identifies an indifference presupposition associated with -ever in the 
following example (his (17)): 
 
 (81) I grabbed whatever tool was handy. 
  
The preferred reading in (81) signals that the speaker grabbed the tool that was handy and 
he did so indiscriminately.  Similarly, the sentence in (82a) has the flavor of an 
indifference reading saying that Zack indiscriminately voted for the person at the top of 
the ballot.  Its paraphrase can be derived in (82b): 
      
 (82) a. Zack simply voted for whoever was at the top of the ballot. 
   b. Zack voted for the person that was at the top of the ballot, and if a 
different person had been at the top of the ballot, Zack would have 
voted for that person. 
 
Von Fintel provides whatever with a semantics that takes the primary contribution of the 
morpheme -ever to be the presupposition of variation with respect to the referent 
expressed by the free relative.  When the modal base is epistemic, variation results in the 
ignorance reading (concerns speaker’s epistemic uncertainty).  When the modal base is 
                                                 
36 This view, that whatever “presupposes” ignorance, is solely von Fintel’s.  However, as we will soon 
clarify in 3.2.2, whatever neither entails ignorance nor presupposes ignorance. 
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counterfactual, the same variation results in the indifference reading.  Just like the modal 
auxiliary must can take on epistemic readings and deontic readings (following Kratzer 
1991), whatever can take on ignorance or indifference readings depending on the modal 
base supplied.  Von Fintel provides the following analysis for whatever:  
 
 (83) whatever (w) (F) (P) (Q) 
         presupposes:  ∀w' ∈ minw  [ F ∩ ( λw'. ιx. P (w')(x) ≠ιx. P (w)(x) )]: 
    Q (w') (ιx. P (w')(x) ) = Q (w) (ιx. P (w)(x) ) 
        asserts: Q (w) (ιx. P (w)(x) )   
 
The world of evaluation is w.  F is the modal base.37  P is the free relative expression and 
Q is the matrix clause expression.  The min-operator triggers an existential 
presupposition that there are worlds in its argument and derives a presupposition of 
variation.  It ensures that the domain of quantification is non-empty and that the worlds 
quantified over differ minimally from one another.  Whatever presupposes that all of the 
worlds in the modal base F that are minimally different from the actual world where the 
FR is different from that in the actual world are such that the truth of the whole sentence 
is the same as in w.  Put simply, whatever says that for all worlds w’ in the modal base in 
which the identity of the FR referent is different from what it is in the actual world, the 
proposition has the same truth value in both w’ and w.  So, (83) simply says that 
regardless of what ιx. P (x) is in all w' minimally different from w with respect to F the 
                                                 
37  The modal base F is assumed to be provided by context following Kratzer (1977, 1981, 1991). 
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modal base, the proposition Q (P (x)) will have the same truth value in both w and w’.  At 
the level of assertion, an FR with -ever is identical to an FR without –ever.38 
Depending on the modal base provided by context, a counterfactual modal 
environment will give rise to an indifference reading. 39   The quantification is over 
counterfactual worlds which differ minimally from the actual world.  In (82a), whoever 
presupposes the following: in all counterfactual worlds w’ which differ minimally from 
the actual world w in which someone different is at the top of the ballot, Zack votes for 
that person iff in w he votes for the person at the top of the ballot in w.  If a different 
person has been at the top of the ballot, Zack would have voted for that person.  This 
captures the reading that Zack votes indifferently. 
In a similar fashion, we can capture the ignorance reading in (78a).  Given von 
Fintel’s analysis, an ignorance reading will be derived in the presence of an epistemic 
modal supplied by the context and the quantification is over speaker’s epistemic 
alternatives.  If the identity of ιx.P (x) differs across the epistemic modal base, then the 
speaker does not know (or is ignorant of) the identity of ιx.P (x).  On the other hand, if 
the identity of ιx.P (x) remains the same across the epistemic modal base, then the 
speaker knows the identity of ιx.P (x).  Whatever in (78a) presupposes that in all of 
speaker’s epistemic worlds minimally different from one another, where Arlo is cooking 
something different, there is a lot of garlic in what he is cooking. 
  
                                                 
38  As shown in Chapter 2 (see Section 2.2.2), the denotation of the FR what John ordered is of type <e>.  
Following Jacobson (1995), an FR denotes the single individual characterized by the predicate--the unique 
maximal individual, the maximal plural entity that John ordered.  This entity can be singular (= the thing 
that John ordered), or plural (= the sum of all the things that John ordered). 
39 Just like the modal verb must can take on epistemic and deontic readings depending on the modal base 
supplied by the context, whatever can also have ignorance and indifference readings that are products of the 
context-dependency of modal expressions following Kratzer’s research program (e.g. Kratzer, 1991). 
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3.2.2 The Ignorance Implication of FRs-ever: A Clarification 
 In this section I show that the so-called “ignorance presupposition” is unlike 
classic cases of presuppositions.  It is not something taken for granted in advance as part 
of the felicity conditions under which a whatever-sentence can be meaningfully uttered.  
Rather, the ignorance implication is more like a Gricean implicature (1975), something 
that a hearer accommodates to make sense of a speaker’s intention. 
 Presuppositions are typically identifiable via a standard set of diagnostics.40  They 
typically follow from sentences that contain the embeddings of the presupposed material.  
For instance, the evidence that (84a) presupposes (84b) comes from the fact that (84b) 
not only follows from utterances of (84a) but also follows from sentences in which (84a) 
is embedded: 
  
 (84) a. Mary stopped smoking.  
         b. Mary used to smoke. 
        c. Mary didn’t stop smoking.  
        d. Did Mary stop smoking? 
 
Presuppositions typically follow from embeddings under negation as in (84c), from 
embeddings involving questions as in (84d), and from embeddings involving conditionals, 
etc.  There are a great range of constructions that carry presuppositions (presupposition 
triggers) according to these standard diagnostics.41  In the case of (84a), the lexical item 
stop triggers the presupposition that Mary used to smoke. 
                                                 
40 Projection tests are widely used in works on presuppositions like Beaver (1997) and Roberts (1999). 
 
41 Constructions that carry presuppositions include factive verbs, definite descriptions, names, and 
demonstratives, etc. 
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 Unlike classic cases of presuppositions (defined under the view of Strawson and 
Frege, for instance) that are necessary conditions on the meaningfulness of a particular 
expression, the so-called “speaker’s ignorance implication” is not what is taken for 
granted in advance as part of the felicity conditions under which a whatever sentence can 
be meaningfully uttered.42  For instance, while the use of whatever in (85a) below is 
compatible with a context where the speaker does in fact know the identity of the FR, the 
presupposition that Nick has a wife triggered by his in (85b) cannot be denied: 
 
(85) a. I promised Arlo not to tell you what it is that he is cooking because he 
wants to surprise you.  All I can say is that there is a lot of garlic in 
whatever Arlo is cooking over there.  So be careful. 
 
         b. *Nick does not have a wife.  His wife is pretty. 
 
Dayal (1997) also observes that modal implications of ignorance and indifference of FRs-
ever can disappear with plural FRs: 
 
 (86) a. I have already returned whatever books you have lent me. 
 b. John cooked ratatouille and goulash.  They both have onions.  Therefore, 
whatever John cooked had onions. 
 
It appears that modal implication of ignorance associated with FRs-ever is not a classic 
case of presupposition.  The piece of information that the speaker does not know the 
identity of the thing in question is not taken for granted as a necessary condition on the 
                                                 
42 If we follow Strawson (1950, 1952), then we say that unless Mary used to smoke is true, the question of 
the truth or falsity of Mary stopped smoking does not arise.   
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meaningfulness associated with the use of whatever.  One question may be asked here.  
Namely, how and when does the ignorance reading arise? 
Some may reason that the ignorance implication is more like a Gricean 
implicature derivable by an interpreter via the Maxim of Quantity.  Grice’s Maxim of 
Quantity (1975) includes two parts: (i) Say what is required (Be as informative as 
required); (ii) Do not say more than is required (Do not be more informative than 
required).  Thus, when the modal base is epistemic, e.g., whenever the identity of the FR–
expression is under discussion, any speaker who fails to identify ιx.P (x), is inviting her 
hearer to draw an implicature that the identity of ιx.P (x) is unknown to her.  On the other 
hand, if she knows the identity of the thing in question, then, by the Maxim of Quantity, 
she should explicitly supply its identity so that the strongest statement can be made given 
what she knows. 
However, as pointed out to me by David Beaver (p.c.), there are many ways for a 
speaker to fail to provide as much information as possible when the identity of ιx.P (x) is 
the question under discussion, for instance, when being asked such a question as “What is 
Arlo cooking?”  As far as the amount of information supplied with regard to the identity 
of ιx.P (x) is concerned, there seems to be no difference between one’s saying: “Whatever 
Arlo is cooking has a lot of onions,” and one’s saying: “That gnarly thing Arlo is cooking 
has a lot of onions.”  Both answers lead to the implication that the speaker does not know 
the identity of ιx.P (x) by the Maxim of Quantity.  Clearly, whatever has an additional 
presupposition that other expressions lack.  
Beaver (p.c.) suggests that the use of whatever requires that certain conditions 
must be met, or the ignorance implication will disappear.  It is reasonable to say that 
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whatever P presupposes that the speaker cannot say what P is.  From this, an implication 
is generated, i.e., the speaker does not know what P is.  Thus, in normal cases, the 
ignorance implication is accommodated (as in (78a), for instance), but in special cases 
like (85a) where this condition is not met, this additional inference is blocked.  
Alternatively, we may posit that the use of whatever P requires for the identity of P to be 
undisclosed in the common ground and so whatever P presupposes that the identity of P 
is open in the conversational context.  This helps us explain why in (86b), where the 
identity of P is revealed in the common ground, the ignorance implication ceases to arise.  
Both conditions for the use of whatever P just mentioned are weaker claims than von 
Fintel’s presupposition of ignorance.  Either whatever P presupposes that the speaker 
cannot say what P is, or it presupposes that the identity of P is open in the conversational 
context.  Crucially, whatever P does not seem to presuppose the speaker doesn't know the 
identity of p.  More work is needed in order to capture the invariant meaning of whatever 
and to account for the mechanism responsible for all possible inferences it produces.  In 
any case, one is cautioned not to take the so-called “ignorance presupposition” as a 
semantic presupposition triggered by the morpheme -ever, but as a kind of inference 
accommodated only when certain conditions are met.  The next section presents a brief 
overview of what we mean by “accommodation.” 
 
3.2.3 Accommodation: a Brief Overview  
In conversation, speakers often take for granted pieces of information and embed 
them in various constructions known as the “presupposition triggers” without notifying 
the hearers.  Even though a speaker does not explicitly make the presupposed material as 
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part of the background information prior to her utterance, a hearer must “accommodate” 
this missing piece of information, in Lewis’s term (1979). 
 Beaver and Zeevat (2007) observe that in discourse, where multiple contexts are 
involved in the interpretation of a complex sentence, accommodations of presupposed 
materials may take place in either the global or the local context.  One of the examples 
the authors consider involves the presupposition that Mary has an ex-husband triggered 
by the possessive pronoun her (their (19)): 
 
 (87) If Mary is smart, then her ex-husband will get nothing. 
a. = Mary has an ex-husband.  If Mary is smart then her ex-husband will get 
nothing. 
b. ≠If Mary has an ex-husband and is smart then her ex-husband will get 
nothing. 
c. ≠ If Mary is smart then she has an ex-husband and her ex-husband will get 
nothing. 
 
Even though the hearer may not have known that Mary has an ex-husband prior to the 
utterance, this missing piece of information must be accommodated to produce a 
felicitous discourse.  In this particular example, global accommodation in (87a) is 
preferred over the intermediate and local accommodation as shown in (87b) and (87c).43  
                                                 
43 There are other cases where global accommodation is blocked when such a process would produce 
inconsistency as shown below (from Beaver and Zeevat’s (10)): 
 
 (9) I don’t know whether it is raining, but Fred thinks that... 
 
Beaver and Zeevat consider a number of principles that might be used to account for where 
accommodations occur.  For example, global accommodation is generally preferred, accommodation that 
maximizes logical strength is preferred, and accommodation that leads to the creation of redundancy is 
prohibited, etc.  Readers are referred to their work for details and further references.  
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Following Beaver & Zeevat (2007), let us say that a presupposition that projects globally 
is identified with accommodation in the global context: 
 
 (88) If Mary’s carrying an umbrella, then she knows that it is raining. 
    = It is raining. If Mary’s carrying an umbrella, then she knows that it is raining. 
 
Here the factive verb “know” triggers a presupposition “it is raining” which projects 
globally.  In the example below, the presupposition “it is raining” is accommodated 
locally and evaluated as part of the assertion: 
 
(89) I wonder if it is raining.  If Mary’s carrying an umbrella, then she knows that          
it is raining. 
= I wonder if it is raining.  If Mary’s carrying an umbrella, then it is raining and 
she knows that it is raining. 
 
Most cases of accommodation discussed in Beaver & Zeevat (2007) pertain to 
presuppositions that are identifiable via a standard set of diagnostics (as mentioned in 
Section 3.2.2 with the example in (84)).  They also typically involve generalized 
implicatures that follow from general properties of language or the lexicon that are 
inferences which regularly occur whenever certain lexical items are used.  We have 
mentioned that the ignorance reading conveyed by FRs-ever is only an inference not as 
strong as classic cases of presuppositions (Section 3.2.2).  However, in so far as a hearer 
considers it necessary to take a speaker’s use of –ever as signaling ignorance in order to 
make sense of the intention of the speaker, we will take the information that the speaker 
does not know the identity of the FR-referent to be a good candidate for accommodation.  
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This is more like a case of accommodation under the account of Thomason (1990).  
Under Thomason’s view, successful accommodation requires that “we first recognize 
someone’s intention to achieve a goal and then establish goals of our own that will assist 
in achieving this goal” (p. 334).  We accommodate whatever is needed to make sense of 
the speaker’s intention to help achieve the joint conversational goals of the interlocutors.  
Most of Grice’s conversational implicatures, then, fall under Thomason’s notion of 
accommodation.  It makes sense for us to take modal implications of ignorance and 
indifference associated with FRs-ever to be implications accommodated by a hearer in 
order to make sense of the speaker’s intentions and achieve the communicational goal. 
  
3.2.4 The Projection Behavior of Ignorance and Indifference 
While von Fintel pursues the idea that whatever is a presuppositional operator, he 
is aware of the fact that the presupposition of ignorance and indifference behave 
differently in embedded contexts.  What he observed was that the agent indifference 
presupposition stays inside an unless-clause, while the so-called “presupposition of 
ignorance” projects out of it.  This is illustrated in the examples in (90) and (91) below: 
 
(90) Unless Zack simply voted for whoever was at the top of the ballot, he must  
have spent at least 5 minutes in the voting booth. 
 
= Unless Zack simply voted indifferently for the person at the top of the 
ballot, he must have spent at least 5 minutes in the voting booth. 
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≠ Zack simply voted indifferently.44  Unless Zack simply voted for the 
person at the top of the ballot, he must have spent at least 5 
minutes in the voting booth. 
  
(91) Unless there’s a lot of garlic in whatever Arlo is cooking, I will eat out  
  tonight. 
= I’m not sure what Arlo is cooking, but unless there’s a lot of garlic in 
what Arlo is cooking, I will eat out tonight. 
≠ Unless I’m sure that there’s a lot of garlic in what Arlo is cooking, I will 
eat out tonight. 
 
In (90), the presupposition of agent’s indifference enters the truth-conditions at the 
embedded level below the unless-clause.  In (91), speaker’s ignorance presupposition 
projects out to the matrix level.  So there appears to be a difference between ignorance 
and indifference uses as far as their behavior in embedded contexts is concerned.   
 Taking the primary function of the morpheme –ever to be presupposing ignorance 
and indifference, the result of von Fintel’s study is a unified account for the meaning of 
whatever.  Though elegant, his analysis leaves one wondering why the so-called 
“presupposition” of ignorance and indifference behave differently in embedded contexts.  
In section 3.2.2 we suggested that whatever does not presuppose ignorance.  Rather, 
whatever seems to presuppose that the speaker cannot say what P is, or that the identity 
of P is open in the conversational context.  If the identity of P is already revealed in the 
common ground, then the implication of speaker’s ignorance does not arise.  In any case, 
a speaker’s epistemic state with regard to the identity of whatever P belongs to the 
common ground.  When it arises, or when a hearer has a reason to accommodate that the 
                                                 
44 Perhaps the sentence Zack simply voted indifferently can be better paraphrased as Zack was indifferent 
with regard to who he voted for (David Beaver, p.c.) 
 72
speaker does not know the identity of P, it is always accommodated to the global context.  
A speaker’s epistemic state is not part of the descriptive content of a sentence that 
contains whatever.  It also does not affect the truth conditions of the sentence in which 
whatever appears.  This can be shown with the following example where intermediate 
accommodation of a speaker’s not knowing the identity of the thing is not available: 
 
 (92) If there’s a lot of garlic in whatever Arlo is cooking, I will eat out tonight.   
       = I don’t know what it is that Arlo is cooking.  If there’s a lot of garlic in 
what Arlo is cooking, I will eat out tonight. 
 
        ≠ If I don’t know what it is that Arlo is cooking and there’s a lot of garlic in  
 what Arlo is cooking, I will eat out tonight. 
 
There certainly are other reasons for why speaker ignorance projects out of 
embedded contexts.45  Nevertheless, recognizing that the ignorance implication does not 
appear to be a presupposition is a good starting point. 
     
3.3 Modal Implications in Chinese Bare Conditionals 
In this section I discuss modal implications in Chinese Bare Conditionals.  I argue 
that although the ignorance and indifference readings are also available in Chinese Bare 
Conditionals, this construction always entails indifference.  Due to the obligatory 
presence of a causal interpretation between two conjuncts, the modal base of Chinese 
                                                 
45 Tredinnick (2005) elaborates on von Fintel’s point and further questions why the presupposition of 
ignorance -ever must project globally.  Following general observations made in the literature, she notes that 
ignorance -ever is an epistemic item and behaves differently from denotic and circumstantial modals by 
virtue of possessing the following properties.  Epistemic items (i) contribute to the expressive/nonassertive 
content of the sentence in which they appear (not affecting the truth conditions of the sentence in which 
they appear); (ii) appear high in the syntax; (iii) can only be bound by attitude subjects. 
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Bare Conditionals is counterfactual by default.  This is unlike the interpretation of 
English FRs-ever which may vary with contextually supplied modal bases. 
 
3.3.1 Available Readings in Bare Conditionals  
 Like English whatever, Chinese Bare Conditionals may be used to signal 
ignorance or indifference: 
 
 (93) A: Dengyixia   shei xian chi? 
   in a minute who first eat 
  ‘Who can eat first in a minute?’ 
 
          B: Shei xian lai,      shei/ta     (jiu)  xian  chi.46  (Ignorance) 
   who first  come  who/s(he) then first  eat   
   ‘Whoever comes/came first, can eat first.’ 
  
 (94) A: Didi              jintian  zenmeyang?  
   little brother today   how 
  ‘How is little brother today?’ 
 
         B: Ta hen guai.        Mama  shou shenme, ta  jiu    zuo shenme. (Indifference) 
   he very obedient mother say   what      he then  do   what 
  ‘He is very obedient.  He did whatever his mother said.’ 
 
In (93), speaker B is being questioned about the identity of the person/people who can eat 
first.  In response, she uttered a sentence that takes the form of a bare conditional without 
stating who the person is/who those people are.  This makes the ignorance reading of the 
                                                 
46 Note that a bare conditional always has an indifference reading.  It just happens that in the context of (93), 
the ignorance reading is a more immediate one. 
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bare conditional in (93B) the most salient one.  The speaker implies that she does not 
know who will be eating first and that whoever (the person) who comes first, can eat first.  
In (94), the context is set up in such a way that the bare conditional in B’s utterance is 
used to signal indifference.  It expresses the little brother’s indifferent attitude towards 
doing what his mother said.  The bare conditional in (94B) has a reading that says that the 
little brother did what his mother told him to do and he did so indiscriminately.   
 Although bare conditionals may be used to signal indifference and ignorance just 
like English FRs-ever, these two constructions differ in their default interpretations and 
their structural characteristics.  The rest of this chapter is devoted to bringing out these 
differences. 
    
3.3.2 The Primary Function of Bare Conditionals as Signaling Indifference 
Recall that Dayal (1995) used the namely-test to highlight the function of English 
FRs-ever as signaling a speaker’s ignorance shown in (79) repeated below in (95a).  
While whatever in (95a) is incompatible with a speaker’s revealing the identity of the 
thing that Arlo is cooking as it flunks the namely-test, the bare conditional in (95b) can 
pass the namely-test:47 
                                                 
47 Just like the sentence containing a plain relative clause in (ib), the bare conditional in (95B) can pass the 
namely-test: 
 
(i) a. Shei xian lai,      shei/ta     (jiu)  xian  chi.  Jiushi     Dawei! 
         who first  come  who/s(he) then first  eat   namely  David 
         ‘Whoever comes/came first, can eat first.  Namely, David!’ 
 
      b. Xianlai       de   ren,                   xian chi. Jiushi     Dawei! 
          first come  Rel  person/people  first  eat  namely   David 
         ‘The person/people who come(s)/came first, can eat first. Namely, David!’ 
 
Note that while the namely-phrase can be inserted in the middle of a sentence that contains a relative clause, 
it cannot occur in between two clauses in a bare conditional.  This contrast between a bare conditional and 
its relative clause counterpart is shown in (ii) and (iii) below: 
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(95) a. *Whatever Mary is cooking, namely ratatouille, uses onions. 
        b. Shei xian lai,      shei/ta     (jiu)  xian  chi.  Jiushi     Dawei! 
             who first  come  who/s(he) then first  eat    namely  David 
          ‘Whoever comes/came first, can eat first.  Namely, David!’ 
 
The contrast between whatever and the bare conditional with respect to their 
compatibility with speaker’s revealing the identity of the thing in question suggests that 
the primary function of a bare conditional is not to signal ignorance, unlike whatever.   
In fact, the primary function of a bare conditional is to assert indifference.  
Consider first the example in (96) below:  
 
(96) Zuotian     shei  zai xuanpiao  shang, Dawei jiu   tou   gei-le     shei/ta. 
          yesterday  who is   ballot        on top  David then vote to-Perf   what/he       
          ‘Yesterday, David voted for whoever appeared on the ballot.’ 
 
The default reading in (96) is one that says David voted indifferently.  If a different 
person had been on the ballot, he would have voted for him.  The bare conditional in (96) 
entails that David voted indifferently.  It cannot be immediately followed by an utterance 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
 
(ii) * Shei xian lai,      jiushi     Dawei,  shei/ta     (jiu)  xian  chi.  
          who first  come  namely  David    who/s(he) then first  eat 
        ‘*Whoever comes/came first, namely David, can eat first.’ 
  
 (iii) Xianlai       de   ren,                   jiushi    Dawei,   xian chi.  
        first come  Rel  person/people  namely  David     first  eat   
         ‘The person/people who come(s)/came first, namely David, can eat first.’ 
 
The fact that the two clauses that form a bare conditional cannot be separated adds another unique aspect to 
the structural properties of this construction.  A bare conditional simply does not permit two clauses to be 
separated.  Adding any word between the two conjuncts will not produce a well-formed bare conditional: 
 
(iv) *Shei xian lai,      wo xiang,   shei/ta     (jiu)  xian  chi.  
         who first  come   I     think    who/s(he) then first  eat 
         ‘Whoever comes/came first, I think, can eat first.’ 
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which expresses David’s strong preference for wanting to vote for a specific candidate as 
shown in (96’):  
 
 (96’) #Shei zai xuanpiao shang Dawei  jiu    tou   shei.  Dawei xiang tuo     Ma.  
             who be  ballot       top     David  then vote  who  David  want  voted  Ma.   
‘He voted for whoever appeared on top of the ballot. David wanted to vote 
 for Ma.’ 
 
That bare conditionals entail indifference is further illustrated in the following example: 
 
(97) A: Dengyixia    ni    xiang chi shenme?   
              In a minute  you want  eat what 
              ‘What would you like to eat in a minute?’ 
 
         B: Ni   zhu   shenme, wo jiu    chi shenme/[e].  Wo bu   zaiyi. 
              you cook what       I    then eat what/[e]         I    not  care 
              ‘I will eat whatever you cook.  I don’t care.’ 
 
         B’: #Ni   zhu   shenme, wo chi shenme/[e]. Wo jintian xiang chi xongzhang. 
                 you cook what       I    eat what/[e]       I     today  want  eat bear paws  
               ‘?I will eat whatever you cook.  Today I want to eat bear paws.’ 
 
Again, the bare conditional in (97B) is not compatible with a speaker’s wanting to eat a 
certain dish as shown in (97B’).   
 
3.3.3 The Obligatory Causal Interpretation of the Conjuncts 
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Lin (1996) notes that two clauses that do not have a causal dependence cannot 
form a bare conditional.  He shows the following example taken from Lű (1980): 
 
(98) *Shei zhan zai nali,  shei (jiu)  hen  gao. 
         who stand in  there  who then very tall 
         ‘The person who is standing there, whoever he is, is tall.’ 
 
Assuming that there can be no causal link established between someone’s standing there 
and her being tall, Lin follows Lű (1980) and claims that (98) is ungrammatical.  
Although I agree with Lin that two clauses that do not have a causal dependence cannot 
form a bare conditional, I wish to emphasize that when a speaker chooses to say (98), she 
is committed to the existence of the causal link necessarily present in the bare conditional.  
Though it is hard to imagine a context where (98) can be appropriately uttered, this does 
not mean that the two clauses in (98) cannot form a bare conditional.  In fact, native 
speakers consider the bare conditional in (98) to be well-formed and it has the 
interpretation in (98’): 
 
(98’) Shei  zhan zai  nali,   shei   (jiu)   hen  gao. 
                    who  stand in   there  who   then  very tall 
         ‘Whoever stands there, (then) will become/became tall.’ 
 
A context where (98’) occurs would be the case in which a ‘magical transformer pad’ can 
turn someone into a tall person, or in which a ‘house of mirrors’ can make someone look 
like a tall person.48  It is true that the same bare conditional cannot have the reading in 
                                                 
48 I thank David Beaver for the example. 
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(98), a mere speaker’s ignorance reading without implying causality.  What we must 
emphasize here is that the two conjuncts in (98) can still form a bare conditional, and that 
(98) is grammatical on the reading in (98’).   
The causal interpretation between common real-world events such as the dropping 
of a glass causing it to break, results from a number of factors.  Those factors include the 
fact that the events in question can be interpreted sequentially, or the fact that our world 
knowledge supports the interpretation where by dropping glass made objects causes them 
to break (cf. Dancygier 1998).  It is unlikely that such a ‘magical transformer pad’ exists 
in the real world.  What we are claiming here is simply that when someone utters (98’), 
the causal interpretation is there for us to grasp even though such a causal link does not 
seem justifiable at first given what we know about the world.  While Lin observes that 
two clauses that do not stand in a causal relation cannot form a bare conditional, his study 
does not show that (98) is grammatical and that the causal interpretation is always present 
in a bare conditional.  Whenever a speaker chooses to say (98), she is committed to the 
causal link between someone’s standing there and her being tall. 
A bare conditional necessarily forces a causal interpretation to exist between two 
clauses that form it.  This is the case even when a bare conditional is used to signal 
ignorance as revealed in the English translation in A’s response in (98’’) below: 
 
 (98’’) Q: Shei hen gao? 
     who very tall 
     ‘Who is tall?’ 
 
           A: Wo bu zhidao.  Shei zhan zai nali,  shei (jiu) hen   gao. 
              I     not know    who stand in  there who then very tall 
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                ‘I don’t know. Whoever stands there, (then) is tall/is thus tall.’ 
 
 That two conjuncts in a bare conditional must be interpreted as causally linked 
can be further illustrated with the following example:49  
 
(99) a. David: Nick mei(-le) shenme, wo jiu   mai       shenme/na xie dongxi. 
                        Nick  bought  what        I   then bought  what/those      things. 
                          ‘I bought whatever Nick bought.’ 
 
         b. David: Meiyang   Nick mei de   dongxi wo  dou mai. 
                          every-CL Nick  buy DE thing     I     all   buy 
               ‘I bought everything Nick bought.’ 
 
  c. Context A: Nick bought wine, pizza, and cigarettes.  David also bought     
those things but didn’t know what Nick bought.   
 
  d. Context B: Nick bought wine, pizza, and cigarettes.  David knew what 
Nick bought and to please Nick, David also bought the same things. 
 
The bare conditional in (99a) cannot be used in context A in (99c) where there is no 
essential connection between Nick’s buying something and David’s buying the same 
thing, while the ordinary mei ‘every’-expression in (99b) can.  Context B in (99d) 
suggests that there is a causal link between Nick’s buying something and David’s buying 
the same thing, and David’s utterance in (99a) is well-suited for this context.  Bare 
conditionals can be associated with modal flavors of ignorance and indifference like 
English whatever-sentences.  However, it is important to point out that bare conditionals 
                                                 
49  This example is due to David Beaver (p.c.). 
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necessarily force a causal interpretation of the conjuncts, while English whatever-
sentences do not.  This is evidenced by the fact that the bare conditional in (99a) cannot 
be used in context A (99c) while the English whatever-sentence can. 
One may wonder why the causal link is always present in bare conditionals.  In 
Section 3.4 we will examine the structure of bare conditionals in detail and return to this 
question.  Given that causation is commonly associated with counterfactual reasoning (cf. 
Lewis 2000), for now, it suffices to say that bare conditionals necessarily force a causal 
interpretation to exist between two conjuncts and they have a default counterfactual 
modal base.   
 
3.3.4 The Indifference Entailment  
 The requirement of a causal interpretation imposed by bare conditionals is further 
revealed in embedded contexts where the indifference presupposition enters the truth 
content of the unless-clause: 
 
     (100) Chufei  mama  shou-le    shenme, ta  jiu     zuo shenme, ta baba     hui   ma    ta. 
   unless   mother say-Perf  what       he then  do   what      his father  will scold him  
   ‘Unless he did whatever (his) mother said, his father will scold him.’ 
   
         = Chufei didi               guaiguai     zuo  mama  shou de,   ta   baba    hui   ma    ta. 
  unless little brother obediently  do    mother say  DE   his father  will  scold him  
‘Unless little brother did indifferently what his mother told him to do irrespective   
of what the thing was (those things were), his father will scold him.’ 
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The bare conditional in (100) says that unless the little brother indifferently did the 
thing(s) that his mother told him to do irrespective of what the thing was (those things 
were), his father will scold him.  The default interpretation of a bare conditional always 
concerns an agent’s/a speaker’s indifferent attitude towards.  The modal implication of 
indifference is part of the assertive content of a bare conditional.  In (100), the 
indifference implication is accommodated below the chufei-‘unless’ clause.  The 
ignorance implication, on the other hand, projects out of the chufei-‘unless’ clause: 
 
 (100’) Chufei  mama  shou shenme, ta  jiu     zuo shenme, ta  baba   hui   ma    ta. 
           unless   mother say   what       he then  do   what      his father will scold him  
           ‘Unless he did whatever (his) mother said, his father will scold him.’ 
 
         a. ≠ Chufei wo  bu   zhidao  didi               zuo shenme,  
     unless   I     not know     little brother do   what 
     didi               guaiguai     zuo  mama    shou de,   ta baba     hui   ma    ta. 
     little brother obediently  do    mother  say    DE  his father will scold him  
  ‘Unless I don’t know what little brother did and he did indifferently what 
   his mother told him to do, his father will scold him.’ 
 
        b. = Wo  bu   zhidao  didi               zuo shenme,  chufei 
     I      not know     little brother do   what       unless 
              didi               guaiguai   zuo mama shou de, ta   baba hui   ma    ta. 
               little brother obediently do mother say  DE his father will scold him  
  ‘I don’t know what little brother did but unless he did indifferently what  
   his mother told him to do, his father will scold him.’ 
 
In (100’a), the ignorance proposition taken under the scope of "unless" is ruled out. 
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3.3.5 The Ignorance Implication 
 A Chinese bare conditional can be used to signal ignorance when the context 
supplies an epistemic modal base.  The ignorance reading is not presupposed. In (101), 
speaker B’s utterance is compatible with a situation where the speaker does in fact know 
which person will be eating first: 
 
(101) A: Ni   zhi    bu  zhidao dengyixia    shei xian chi? 
    you know not know   in a minute who first eat 
   ‘Do you know who can eat first in a minute?’ 
 
          B: Shei laile,                      shei/ta  jiu    xian chi.  Jiu        shi Dawei! 
   who come-completive  who/he then first  eat   namely be  David 
   ‘Whoever came first can eat first. Namely, David!’  
 
Likewise in the example below, the bare conditional in speaker B's utterance is 
compatible with a context where the speaker does in fact know what it was that her didi 
‘younger brother' did: 
 
 (102)  A: Natian    didi               zuo-le     shenme? 
       that day  little brother do-Perf   what 
       ‘What did little brother do that day?' 
 
                  B: Mama  shou-le     shenme, ta  jiu   (shi) zuo-le    shenme, 
               mother say-Perf   what       he then  be   do-Perf  what       
       ta   bangmang dasao fangzi. 
       he  help           clean house 
                        ‘He did whatever mother said, he helped (her) clean the house.’ 
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When the speaker's epistemic state is the question under discussion, the bare conditional 
alone in speaker B's utterance in (102) has an ignorance reading.  It implies that the 
speaker does not know, or is uncertain as to what her didi ‘younger brother' did.  Again, 
the ignorance reading is only implicated.   
 
3.4 On the Indifference Implication in Chinese Bare Conditionals: A Comparison 
with English Whatever 
In this section, I capture the agent’s/speaker’s indifference reading of Chinese 
Bare Conditionals with von Fintel’s semantics of whatever.  The counterfactual modal 
base in von Fintel’s analysis implies causality and is best suited for bare conditionals.  A 
bare conditional differs from whatever in that the former necessarily implies causality 
while the latter does not.  Two clauses must be temporally ordered in bare conditionals 
but not in -ever sentences.  The first wh-clause in a bare conditional is left adjoined to the 
second clause, while an -ever clause occurs in an argument position.  These facts 
contribute to the problem with translations between the two constructions. 
 
3.4.1 A Counterfactual Modal Base for Bare Conditionals 
 In von Fintel’s analysis, the indifference reading of whatever involves a 
counterfactual modal base.  When the modal base F is counterfactual, whatever 
presupposes that a minimal change in the identity of the FR referent would not make a 




(83) whatever (w) (F) (P) (Q): 
         presupposes:  ∀w' ∈ minw  [ F ∩ ( λw'. ιx. P (w')(x) ≠ιx. P (w)(x) )]: 
    Q (w’) (ιx. P (w’)(x) ) = Q (w) (ιx. P (w)(x) )   
 
        asserts: Q (w) (ιx. P (w)(x) ) 
 
In von Fintel’s analysis, the “indifference” uses of whatever mainly concern an agent’s 
indifferent attitude and convey a kind of indifference on the part of an agent (signaling 
that he or she does not care).  When we apply the semantics of (83) to (103a), we get the 
presupposition of indifference saying that Zack voted for the person on top of the ballot 
irrespective of who the person was as shown in (103b):  
 
 (103) a. Zack simply voted for whoever was at the top of the ballot. 
 
                      b. Presupposition:  
  In all worlds w’ minimally different from the actual world w in which 
  someone different is at the top of the ballot, Zack votes for that person iff 
  in w Zack votes for the person at the top of the ballot in w. 
 
The quantification is over counterfactual alternatives which differ from the actual world 
in who is at the top of the ballot.  The whatever-FRs say that in worlds that differ in the 
identity of the FR-referent, the truth of the sentence is still the same.  The presence of a 
counterfactual modal base implies that there is an essential connection between 
someone’s being at the top of the ballot and his voting for that person.  Zack’s indifferent 
attitude is easily inferred when we begin to wonder why the counterfactual entailment is 
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as it is, i.e., if a different person had been at the top of the ballot, Zack would have voted 
for that person.     
Counterfactual thinking is closely linked to causal beliefs.  Typically, when we 
engage in counterfactual thinking, we imagine alternatives to the real world.  We engage 
in the thinking process, wondering that had A never happened, B would not have occurred.  
A causes B is commonly taken to mean that “if A had not occurred, B would not have 
occurred” (cf. Lewis 1973b).50  Counterfactual thinking can produce a heightening of 
affect brought about by realizing that an outcome was not inevitable because it easily 
could have been undone. 51   Counterfactual thinking can amplify feelings of regret, 
distress, shame and guilt, as well as satisfaction and happiness.  By telling ourselves that 
if Obama had reacted sooner to the oil-spill, the gulf would not have been so badly 
polluted, we ascribe causal status to our president for the environmental disaster.  Von 
Fintel’s analysis aims to capture the indifference reading of whatever with reference to an 
agent’s/speaker’s indifferent attitude.  The agent’s/speaker’s indifference reading of 
whatever can be easily inferred in the presence of a counterfactual modal base when we 
look for an agent that is responsible for creating a causal link between the FR-clause and 
the matrix clause. 52   We will discuss shortly in Section 3.4.2, however, that the 
indifference uses of whatever can also convey a sense of “indifference” without 
referencing an agent’s/a speaker’s attitude and without construing a causal link between 
the FR-clause and the matrix clause.     
                                                 
50 I thank David Beaver for the discussion on the causal link (p.c.) and take sole responsibility for any 
wrong assumption. 
 
51 See Kahneman and Miller (1986) via Spellman and Mandel (1999). 
 
52 Tredinnick (2005) also makes the observation that the agent’s indifference reading of whatever can be 
easily inferred when we look for an agent that is responsible for creating a causal link between the FR-
clause and the matrix clause. 
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Still, a counterfactual modal base in von Fintel’s analysis that predicts a causal 
link between the FR-clause and the matrix clause is exactly what we need for the 
interpretation of bare conditionals.  As just discussed in Section 3.3.3, a causal 
interpretation is necessarily present in a bare conditional.  When an agent is present, the 
agent’s indifference reading is hard to negate.  The counterfactual entailment in the 
example in (97B) (repeated here in (104a)) is (104b):  
  
(104) a. Ni   zhu   shenme, wo (jiu) chi shenme.   
              you cook what       I    then eat what           
              ‘I will eat whatever you cook.’ 
 
          b. Counterfactual Entailment:  
 If you cooked a different thing, I would eat that thing.   
 
          c. #Ni   zhu   shenme, wo chi shenme. Wo jintian xiang chi xongzhang. 
                 you cook what       I    eat what       I     today  want  eat bear paws  
               ‘?I will eat whatever you cook.  Today I want to eat bear paws.’ 
 
This indifference reading in the case of (104a) has an agent, an attitude holder as part of 
the interpretation and the agent’s attitude is held responsible for making this 
counterfactual entailment valid.  At the same time, the causal link between the conjuncts 
forces us to think of something that is responsible for the causal link to hold, i.e., the link 
between the addressees’s cooking something and the speaker’s eating that thing.  From 
that we infer that the speaker does not care.  This is why the bare conditional in (104a) 
cannot be followed by a speaker’s wanting a certain dish as shown in (104c).  We can 
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capture the indifference reading of bare conditionals with von Fintel’s semantics for 
whatever providing it with a counterfactual modal base: 
 
(105) bare conditional (w) (Fcounterfactual) (P) (Q)  
  Presupposes and entails:  
  ∀w' ∈ minw  [ F ∩ ( λw'. ιx. P (w')(x) ≠ιx. P (w)(x) )]: 
    Q (w’) (ιx. P (w’)(x) ) = Q (w) (ιx. P (w)(x) ) 
 
The causal link between the two clauses implied by the counterfactual modal base in (105) 
is signaled by the default connectively jiu ‘then’ in a bare conditional.  In Chinese two 
clauses that are linked by the morpheme jiu ‘then’ are presented as causally dependent or 
sequentially ordered.  A bare conditional contains an optional jiu ‘then’ by default and 
always implies that there is an essential connection, a causal link between the two clauses.  
As mentioned in Chapter 1, a bare conditional can receive a conditional interpretation or 
it can be used to describe a fact (Section 1.1).  When describing a future event and 
ιx.P(w)(x) is not yet defined, a bare conditional appears like a conditional statement 
saying that if there is a thing such that it satisfies P, then it will have the property of Q as 
shown in (105’): 
 
(105’) Bare conditional describing future events (w)(P)(Q)  
Asserts: ∃!x.P(w)(x) → Q(w) (ιx.P(w)(x) ) 
 
Regardless of whether ιx.P(w)(x) is defined in the actual world, a bare conditional has the 
modal implication in (105).  For instance, the modal implication in (104a) says that in all 
of the minimally different counterfactual worlds in which the addressee cooks something 
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different, the speaker will eat that thing in the actual world (by (105)).  In other words, if 
the addressee had cooked something different, then the speaker would have eaten that 
thing.  From that we infer that an agent (if present) has an indifferent attitude.  If no agent 
is present, then we infer that some other force is making the causal link hold.  This 
explains why the example in (98’) forces us to imagine that some supernatural power is 
responsible for the counterfactual entailment and for the existence of a causal link 
between someone’s standing there and her being tall.   
The link between counterfactual reasoning and causal beliefs is still a hotly 
debated topic.  It suffices to say that the agent’s/speaker’s indifference implication in a 
bare conditional can be adequately captured with von Fintel’s analysis that employs a 
counterfactual modal base.  Though not stated in (105), let us simply note that if the 
context supplies an epistemic modal base (when F is epistemic), then bare conditionals 
implicate ignorance just like whatever. 
 
3.4.2 Chinese Bare Conditionals are not just Whatever: Temporal Order, Causal 
Link, and the Problem of Translation 
As mentioned in Chapter 1 (Section 1.3), a whatever-sentence cannot always be 
translated using a bare conditional.  Consider the example in (14) repeated here in (106): 
 
 (106) a. David will say whatever you say. 
 
                    b. ≠ Dawei shuo   shenme, ni    jiu    shou  shenme. 
                  David  say     what      you  then say    what 
                  ‘You will say whatever David says.’ 
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          c. =  Ni   shou   shenme, Dawei jiu   shuo shenme. 
                  you say     what      David  then say    what 
                 ‘David will say whatever you say.’ 
 
To properly translate (106a), we must place the clause expressing “you tell David 
something” before the clause that expresses “David will say the thing” as shown in 
(106c).  Similarly (107a) cannot be translated into (107b) for the same reason. 
  
(107) a. David danced with whoever asked him to dance. 
 
             ≠ b. Dawei  gen  shei   tiaowu,  shei jiu   qing-le    Dawei tiaowu. 
     David  with who  dance    who then ask-PRF David  dance 
    ‘Whoever asked David to dance, (again) danced with David.’      
 
         = c. Shei qing-le    Dawei tiaowu, Dawei (jiu)  gen  shei/ta     tiaowu. 
                who ask-PRF  David  dance   David  then  with who/she  dance   
     ‘David danced with whoever asked him to dance.’ 
 
In (107b), it is pragmatically unsound to perceive the event of someone’s asking David to 
dance as occurring after David’s dancing with her.  The examples in (106) and (107) 
suggest that two clauses that form a bare conditional are required to stand in a temporal 
order.  The event described by the first clause must precede the event described by the 
second clause on a temporal scale. 
That two clauses that form a bare conditional must be temporally ordered also 
follows from the fact that bare conditionals may contain the morpheme jiu ‘then’. 53  In 
                                                 
53 There is another morpheme in Mandarin that is often translated as then in English.  Chu (1998) suggests 
that jiu ‘then’ and cai ‘then’ (termed “modality adverbs”) display different discourse functions in Mandarin 
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Chinese, when the morpheme jiu ‘then’ connects two clauses, the clause precedes jiu 
‘then’ must be interpreted as preceding the clause that follows jiu ‘then’.  The fact that 
bare conditionals may contain an optional jiu ‘then’ indicates that the two clauses that 
form the construction are temporally ordered and that the first clause occurs prior to the 
second.  This explains why (106c) and (107c) are well-formed bare conditionals while 
(106b) and (107b) are not.  When an event precedes another event, we naturally take the 
first event as one of the causes of the second event (again, see Lewis 2000).  The causal 
interpretation necessarily forced by bare conditionals correlates closely with the temporal 
order of the conjuncts, the nature of the morpheme jiu ‘then’, and the nature of common 
reasoning that we typically think of causation.  Again, the causal interpretation between 
the two clauses is necessarily present in a bare conditional.  Bare conditionals entail 
indifference and the agent’s indifference reading is hard to cancel (see for instance, the 
examples in (96’) and (97)).  Although the indifference uses of whatever can also convey 
“indifference” without reference to an agent’s/a speaker’s attitude and without construing 
a causal link between the FR-clause and the matrix clause, a causal link and a 
counterfactual modal base are needed for the interpretation of bare conditionals.   
                                                                                                                                                 
Chinese (p.101).  While jiu ‘then’ indicates a sufficient condition, cai ‘then’ is used to show a necessary 
condition: 
 
 (i) Chabuduo chile ershi nian de   ku,           cai    ba   tamen daidao    zheme da. 
      almost       eat-LE 20  year DE suffering, CAI BA they     Bring-to this      big 
      ‘Only through nearly 20 years’ suffering, did (I) bring them (i.e. the children) up.’ 
 
 (ii) Ta biyele,                 jiu dao biede difang qu gongzuo. 
       he/she graduate-LE JIU to   other place   go work 
       ‘He/she will leave for work after graduation.’ 
 
The cai in (i) indicates that only after nearly 20 years of suffering did the speaker of (i) bring them up--a 
necessary condition, while the jiu in (ii) indicates that upon graduation he/she will leave for work--a 
sufficient condition (p. 99).  Our discussion focuses on jiu ‘then’ and its sequential usage.      
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The requirement of a causal interpretation between the two conjuncts that form a 
bare conditional poses a strong restriction on the translation between a bare conditional 
and a whatever-sentence.  Specifically, a sentence containing an FRs-ever cannot always 
be translated into a bare conditional.  Translating an FR-ever sentence that apparently 
lacks a causal interpretation into a bare conditional is barred.  The meaning of the FR-
ever sentence in (108) cannot be preserved when the sentence is translated into the bare 
conditional in (109).  For the person’s drinking with Nick does not need to be a cause of 
her becoming a good looking girl in (108): 
  
(108) Whoever drank with Nick that night was pretty. 
 
 (109) Nawan     shei gen   Nick hejiu, shei (jiu)  piaoliang. 
           that night who with Nick drink  who then pretty 
           ‘Whoever drank with Nick that night became/will become pretty.’ 
 
Lin claims that “a bare conditional is ill-formed, if its left and right clauses do not involve 
a causal dependence” and argues that the example in (98’), repeated in (110), is ill-
formed “because the property of being tall is only an accidental property for the person 
who is standing there” (p. 274): 
 
(110) Shei zhan zai nali,  shei (jiu) hen gao. 
         who stand in  there who then very tall 
         ‘Whoever stands there, (then) will become/became tall.’ 
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Once again, I emphasize that the bare conditional in (110) is grammatical on the reading 
that someone’s standing there described by the first clause will cause that person’s being 
tall described by the second clause.  Even though such casual link may be strange, it is 
necessary for the interpretation of the bare conditional.  The ignorance reading is 
available in (110) but crucially the bare conditional asserts indifference.  The problem of 
translation is due to the fact that the temporal order of the clauses is required in a bare 
conditional but not in whatever-sentences.  The strict temporal order of the conjuncts that 
form a bare conditional produces a causal link necessarily present in the construction.   
While two clauses that form a bare conditional are required to stand in a temporal 
order, English whatever-sentences do not have this requirement.  English whatever-
sentences do not require the FR-clause and the matrix clause to be temporally ordered:54 
 
(111) Whatever John ate that’s what his mother cooked.  If John had been eating 
something else, that is because his mother would have prepared that other 
thing.   
 
In Chinese, it would be impossible to express (111) using a bare conditional because two 
clauses that form a bare conditional are required to stand in a temporal order such that the 
first precedes the second.  As noted by David Lewis (2000), almost everything that 
precedes an event will be counted as among its causes (P. 187).  This structural 
requirement contributes to the presence of the causal interpretation of the conjuncts that 
is responsible for the agent’s indifference entailment in a bare conditional (Section 3.4.1). 
                                                 
54 The example here is due to David Beaver (p.c.).  He points out that there is a difference between 
conditionals and FR-ever.  It is odd to say: If John hadn’t had his umbrella with him, then it wouldn’t have 
been raining.  However, it is fine to say: Whatever John ate that’s what Mary cooked. 
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Whenever an agent is present in a bare conditional, her indifferent attitude is hard to 
negate: 
 
(112) Mali   jian  shei,  (jiu)  ai     shei.   # Ta    hen    tiaoti. 
                      Mary  see  who    then love who       she  very   picky 
          ‘Mary falls/fell in love with whoever she saw. She is very picky.’ 
 
In (112), it is hard for the bare conditional to be followed by a proposition saying that 
Mary is a picky person.  Mary’s indifferent attitude is responsible for the causal 
connection between her seeing someone and her falling in love with them.  Unlike bare 
conditionals, the agent’s indifference reading is not necessarily needed for the 
interpretation of whatever.  In Mary fell in love with whoever she saw, Mary’s decision to 
fall in love with the people she sees can be anything but indifferent.     
The indifference reading in von Fintel’s analysis is interpreted against a 
counterfactual modal base which implies temporality.  The counterfactual modal base 
also predicts causal link.  While adopting his semantics for bare conditionals seems 
plausible, applying a counterfactual semantics directly to English –ever may not be 
entirely correct.  The problem of translation is due to the fact that the temporal order of 
the clauses is required in a bare conditional but not in whatever-sentences.  The 
consequence of the strict temporal order of the conjuncts that form a bare conditional is 
the causal link necessarily present in the construction.  English whatever-sentences do not 
have this requirement and there does not need to be a causal connection.  It turns out that 
von Fintel’s analysis can adequately capture the indifference reading of bare conditionals 
but it may not be entirely correct for whatever.  
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3.4.3 A Diagram for the Form and Interpretation of Bare conditionals in 
Comparison with Whatever 
 Let us illustrate the structural requirement that gives rise to the causal 
interpretation between the two clauses with the tree diagram in (113b) for the example in 
(110) shown again in (113a):  
 
 (113) a. Shei zhan zai nali,  shei (jiu) hen gao. 
            who stand in  there who then very tall 
           ‘Whoever stands there, (then) will become/became tall.’ 
 
           b.      
                       IP   tall (ιx (person (x) & stand there (x))) 
            λy. tall (y) 
       i 
     CP  ιx(person (x) & stand there (x))  IP    tall (i)   
                       
     NP  t i     VP  λy. y tall 
 
who stand there        who i                tall  
 
 
Based on what we have argued in Chapter 2, the first wh-clause is an iota expression and 
the pro-form (wh-word/pronoun) in the main clause has the interpretation of a bound 
variable with the adjoined index being the binder.  The iota can pick up either a unique 
singular (a singular definite reading) or a unique plural individual (a universal reading).  
If only one person stands there then the CP has a singular definite reading; if multiple 
people stand there, then the CP has a universal reading.   
In Chinese, using relative clauses with a relativizer is not the most productive 
strategy for modifying nouns.  Specifically, what is the background of the first event may 
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not be the content of a relative clause to modify the head noun.  Consider the following 
example (cf. Chu 1998): 
 
(114) a. I checked out a book from the library which turned out to be boring. 
          b. *Wo cong tushuguan jie-le          yiben  jieguo   buhaokan        de     shu. 
                I     from  library      borrow-LE a-CL  turn out not interesting REL book. 
 
A direct translation in Chinese of (114a) is not available because the first event is not 
jieguo buhaokan ‘turn out not interesting’.  In other words, the content of the relativized 
clause in (114b) jieguo buhaokan ‘turn out not interesting’ is not the background 
information, hence the unacceptability.  The appropriate rendering of (114a) in Chinese 
must not contain a relative clause but should be expressed with two independent clauses 
instead: 
 
(115) wo cong   tushuguan jie-le           yiben shu.    (e) jieguo    buhaokan. 
          I     from  library       borrow-LE a-CL  book    e   turn out not interesting  
         ‘I checked out a book from the library (and it) turned out to be boring.’ 
 
Chinese relative clauses have a background function that “reduces weight to a piece of 
information to make it serve as the background” (Chu 1998).  The restriction on the 
formation of relative clauses in Chinese makes the utilization of independent clauses a 
more common strategy for noun modification.  Though the first clause of a bare 
conditional appears to have a structure of a normal sentence without relativization, it can 
have the meaning of a relativized NP by virtue of being picked up by the pro-form in the 
main clause.  This is like the empty pronoun in the second clause of the example in (115).  
It picks up the book checked out from the library.   
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While the first wh-clause in a bare conditional is adjoined to the left of the main 
clause, a whatever-clause is generated in an argument position.  Given that a free relative 
has quantificational force (a definite), following Srivastav (1991) we can assume that it is 
subject to Quantifier Raising and the –ever sentence in (116a) will have the LF in (116b): 
 
(116)  a. SS: I will do whatever she tells me. 
b. LF: [IP [CP whatever she tells me]] [IP I will do ti ]   
 
As Srivastav (1991) suggests, English free relatives are dominated by NPs and can occur 
in case and theta marked positions.  If they are NPs, they will be predicted to freely occur 
in either subject or an object position.  The first clause in Chinese bare conditionals, 
although it has the meaning of a relative clause, is nevertheless a CP, and must always be 
adjoined to IP and barred from argument positions.  To express the English –ever 
sentence in (116a), the first clause of the bare conditional in (116’a) must be left adjoined 
to IP and cannot occur inside the argument position of the VP (116’b): 
  
 (116’) a. [IP [CP Ta  gen  wo shuo shenme], [IP wo  jiu  zuo shenme]]. 
              she with me say   what             I    then do what 
              ‘I will do whatever she tells me.’ 
      
b. *[IP Wo [VP zuo [ta   gen  wo shuo shenme]. 
           I           do   she with me say   what        
 
  c. *[IP Wo  jiu  zuo shenme], [CP ta   gen  wo shuo shenme]. 
            I      then do what       she with me say   what 
           ‘I will do whatever she tells me.’ 
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A bare conditional requires the main clause to occur after the subordinate clause.  When 
we try to switch the order between the first clause and the main clause, we get an ill-
formed sentence (116’c).  Such a requirement in turn forces a temporal order and 
produces a causal link between the two clauses.  In contrast, English whatever-sentences 
do not have these requirements and a causal link is not necessary for the interpretation of 
whatever.  
Note that in this dissertation, I separate quantification from modal implications to 
discuss the meaning of bare conditionals.  Quantification in bare conditionals is presented 
using the trees in (113b) and in (58) (Chapter 2), while modal implications are summed 
up using the formula in (105).  Here we assume a constructional account rather than a 
lexical rule approach.  If we take the traditional lexical rule approach, then the meaning 
of a bare conditional would be analyzed as part of the meaning of the verb or wh-word.  
However, the meaning of the first clause does not mean the same thing as the first clause 
standing alone—the first clause is not interpreted as a question sentence.  So there must 
be a rule deriving the NP meaning of the first clause in the construction of bare 
conditionals.  However, no relativizer is present in bare conditionals.  The first clause is 
interpreted as if relativized as soon as the second clause appears.  The meaning of the 
first clause is particular to the bare conditional construction.  Moreover, a wh-word in the 
second clause of bare conditionals is analyzed not as a question word, nor as a wh-
indefinite meaning ‘something/someone’ (commonly assumed in the literature of Chinese 
linguistics), but as an anaphoric definite.  The causal relation between the two conjuncts 
is conveyed by the default linking element, i.e. the morpheme jiu ‘then’ whose function is 
discussed in the previous section (Section 3.4.2).  For these reasons, we take Chinese bare 
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conditionals as a construction and as an independently represented syntactic unit in their 
own right, and possess their own semantics as well as syntax. 
 
3.5 Conclusion 
In this chapter, I examined modal implications associated with Chinese bare 
conditionals drawing comparison with English FRs-ever.  I adopted von Fintel’s 
semantics for whatever to capture the modal flavor of Chinese bare conditionals with 
some modifications.  I emphasized that modal implication of ignorance associated with 
whatever is not a classic case of presupposition, but an implicature that is accommodated 
when certain conditions for the use of whatever are met in the common ground.  I showed 
that Chinese bare conditionals have characteristics that are not found with English FRs-
ever and explained why sometimes they cannot be translated from one into the other.  
Two conjuncts that form a bare conditional are temporally ordered and must occur in a 
temporal order so that the antecedent clause describes an event that occurs prior to the 
event expressed by the consequent clause.  Chinese bare conditionals necessarily force a 
causal interpretation to exist between two conjuncts.  Given that causation is commonly 
associated with counterfactual reasoning (Lewis 2000), Chinese bare conditionals have a 
default counterfactual modal base.  FRs-ever sentences, on the other hand, do not have a 
default modal base.  At the level of assertion, the indifference reading is always part of 
the truth conditional content of a bare conditional, while this reading may be absent with 
whatever.  Indifference reading in von Fintel’s analysis is interpreted against a 
counterfactual modal base which implies temporality and predicts causal link.  While we 
have evidence from bare conditionals that a counterfactual semantics is adequate in 
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capturing the agent’s indifference reading, it may not be applied directly to whatever.  
For a bare conditional requires two clauses to be temporally ordered and the causal link 
necessarily present in the construction.  English whatever-sentences do not have this 
requirement and there need not be a causal connection.  While the first wh-clause in a 
bare conditional is adjoined to the left of the main clause, a whatever-clause is generated 
in an argument position.  These differences between bare conditionals and whatever-
sentences contribute to the problem of translation between these two constructions. 
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Chapter 4  
Pronoun Occurrence in Chinese Bare Conditionals 
 
Pronoun occurrence has been a central issue in the debate over the syntax and 
semantics of Chinese Bare Conditionals.  Cheng and Huang (1996) argue that a pronoun 
cannot be directly bound by an operator in an Ā-position and cannot occur in a bare 
conditional whose interpretation involves unselective binding over variables introduced 
by wh-words.  Lin (1996) claims that a pronoun can occur in a bare conditional if it can 
pick up a unique individual in the actual world.  He posits different logical forms to 
separate bare conditionals with a pronoun from those with two identical wh-words.  
Neither is correct.   
This chapter provides the theoretical background for donkey sentences by 
introducing E-type pronouns and donkey sentences in relation to conditional donkey 
sentences in Chinese (Section 4.1).  It reviews and summarizes two important analyses 
from Cheng and Huang (1996) and Lin (1996) (Section 4.2).  We will see that a pronoun 
in a bare conditional does not display characteristics of E-type pronouns and that Lin’s 
constraint on the use of pronoun does not hold within or outside bare conditionals.  Under 
our account, the anteceding wh-phrase in a bare conditional is a definite description and 
its anaphoric element in the second clause (which may be a pronoun or a second wh-word) 
has the interpretation of a bound variable.  Our analysis is able to cover quantification in 
all cases of bare conditionals (Section 4.3).  Possible explanations for pronoun occurrence 
in bare conditionals will be suggested as well (Section 4.4). 
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4.1 Background: Characteristics of E-type Pronouns 
 There are different types of personal pronouns.  Referential pronouns inherit their 
referents from other referring expressions.  Pronouns that function as bound variables do 
not refer to a particular individual.  Consider the pronouns in the following examples:     
 
(117) a. David left the meeting.  He was mad.   
      b. Every student loves his professor. 
 
The pronoun “he” in (117a) is a referential pronoun.  It refers to the individual “David” 
or to some other contextually understood individual (e.g., by pointing to Nick when 
uttering “he”).  On one reading of the sentence in (117b), the pronoun is a variable and 
has a quantifier as its antecedent.  E-type pronouns are neither referential picking up a 
reference from a referring expression, nor variables bound by a quantified antecedent.  
Consider the pronoun in the following example: 
 
 (118) Few congressmen admire Kennedy and they are very junior.    
 
The pronoun in the second clause cannot be bound by few congressmen.  As discussed in 
Evans (1977), we may not treat the pronoun in (118) as a bound variable because few 
congressmen and they are in separate sentences and no possible landing site is high 
enough for few congressmen to c-commend they.  Moreover, even if this c-commend 
relation can be established, the pronoun they interpreted as a bound pronoun will provide 
a reading that is obviously not available to this sentence: Few congressmen are such that 
they both admire Kennedy and are very junior.  This is equivalent to (118’):       
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 (118’) Few congressmen: x (x admire Kennedy, and x are very junior) 
 
The sentence in (118) entails that few congressmen admire Kennedy, whereas (118’) 
would be true if many congressmen admire Kennedy.  Clearly, (118’) may be used to 
imply that there are many congressmen who admire Kennedy, even though only a few of 
them are junior.  This is a reading that is unavailable for (118).  The available reading for 
(118) is one that requires the pronoun they be treated as an E-type pronoun as the 
sentence entails first that few congressmen admire Kennedy period, and second that all 
the congressmen who admire Kennedy are very junior. 
 E-type pronouns can also be found in conditional sentences.  Conditional 
sentences with E-type pronouns or donkey anaphora are commonly referred to as 
conditional donkey sentences.  Below is a classic example of such sentences: 
 
 (119) If a man owns a donkey, he beats it.  
 
According to Evans, the pronouns he and it have status which is more on a par with 
definite descriptions than true variables.  Under such an analysis, the donkey sentence in 
(119) is interpreted as if a man owns a donkey, the man who owns the donkey will beat 
the donkey he owns (see also Cooper 1979).  Another characteristic of an E-type pronoun 
is that it must take the plural form if its antecedent is a universal quantifier or plural: 
 
 (120) a. If a farmer owns every donkey, he will beat them/*it.   
         b. Few congressmen admire Kennedy and they are/*he (*she) is very junior. 
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In sum, a donkey pronoun is neither referential picking up a reference from a referring 
expression, nor a bound variable.  It must be plural in form when its antecedent is plural. 
 
4.2 Previous Analyses of Bare Conditionals: Their Views on Pronoun Occurrence 
 
4.2.1 Cheng and Huang (1996) 
 In Mandarin Chinese, donkey sentences typically take the form of conditional 
sentences which may involve a wh-word in the antecedent clause and an element 
anaphoric to it in the consequent clause.  Cheng and Huang (1996) declare the existence 
of two paradigms of conditionals.  They term one type “Bare Conditionals” and the other 
type “Ruguo ‘if’-conditionals” as shown in (121) and (122) below respectively:55 
 
 (121) a. Shei   xian   lai,      shei /*ta   (jiu)   xian  chi.      
                   who   first    come,  who/(s)he then  first   eat  
                  ‘If x comes first, x eats first.’ 
 
          b. Ni    xihuan shei, shei/*ta     jiu     daomei. 
              you  like      who who/(s)he  then  unlucky 
              ‘If you like x, x is unlucky.’ 
                                                 
55 Cheng and Huang also include dou ‘all’-conditionals in their study.  The authors group dou ‘all’-
conditionals and ruguo ‘if’-conditionals together to contrast with bare conditionals with respect to their 
syntactic distributions.  They claim that in dou-conditionals as in ruguo ‘if’-conditionals, there is no ruguo 
‘if’, but an overt quantifier-like element dou ‘all’ is found in the main clause instead.  They also believe 
that in dou-conditionals as in ruguo ‘if’-conditionals, a second wh-word is not allowed in the consequent 
clause.  They provide the following example to illustrate these properties of dou-conditionals: 
 
 (i) Ni   jiao shei jin-lai, wo dou jian ta/*shei. 
      you ask who enter    I     all  see  him(her)/who 
      ‘Whoever you ask to come in, I’ll see him/her.’ 
 
To simplify the matter, we will not discuss dou ‘all’-conditionals here but focus on bare conditionals and 
ruguo ‘if’-conditionals instead. 
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 (122) a. Ruguo you  shei qiaomen,     ni    jiu   jiao ta/*shei          jin-lai.     
                        if        have who knock door you then ask him(her)/who come in. 
                    ‘If someone knocks on the door, you’ll ask him/her to come in.’ 
 
           b. Ruguo ni    kandao shei, qing     jiao ta/*shei           lai      jian wo. 
               if         you  see       who  please tell  him(her)/who come  see  me 
              ‘If you see someone, please ask him/her to come see me.’ 
 
Cheng and Huang define these two types of conditionals based on the following 
structural properties: ruguo ‘if’-conditionals contain an overt leading element ruguo ‘if’, 
while bare conditionals cannot be lead by it; ruguo ‘if’-conditionals allow the presence of 
a consequent pronoun whereas bare conditionals prohibit it.   
 Following standard DRT (Discourse Representation Theory), Cheng and Huang 
provide the unselective binding treatment in (121) for the bare conditionals in (123a): 
 
 (123) a. NECx [x come first] [x eat first]56 
               Qx      restriction       nuclear scope  
 
           b. ∀x (x come first → x eat first) 
 
The universal force of wh-words in bare conditionals comes from the covert necessity 
operator.  A quantificational element is assumed to create a tripartite structure: Q [A] [B], 
where A is the restriction of Q and B is the nuclear scope of Q (cf. Heim 1982).  
Assuming that quantifier Q must bind an occurrence of x in its restrictive clause and its 
nuclear scope (Kratzer 1989), the necessity operator must bind two occurrences of the 
                                                 
56 The covert necessity operator is abbreviated as “NEC” here.  
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same wh-word.  Otherwise, the constraint against vacuous quantification will be violated.  
Cheng and Huang argue that a pronoun cannot occur in the consequent clause of a bare 
conditional.  For the Chinese pronoun ta ‘he/she’ cannot be directly bound by an operator 
in an Ā-position.  If it appears in the consequent clause of a bare conditional, it would 
have to be bound by such an operator (the necessity operator).  That ta ‘he/she’ cannot 
pick up its reference from an operator in an Ā-position is evident from the following data 
(cf. Aoun and Li 1989, 1990):57 
 
 (124) a. Meigereni    dou shuo ta*i/j   bu xihuan pijiu. 
   everyone      all   say   he      not like     beer 
  ‘Everyone said that he does not like beer.’ 
 
               b. Meigereni    dou xihuan ta*i/j   de  baba. 
                  everyone     all   like      he      DE father 
                  ‘Everyone likes his father.’ 
 
Chinese ta ‘he/she’ differs from its English counterpart in that the former cannot be 
bound by meige ren ‘everyone’ while the latter can be treated as a bound variable.  While 
the Chinese sentence in (124b) cannot have a bound reading that says everyone likes his 
own father, its English counterpart can.  Cheng and Huang’s analysis has the assumption 
that a Chinese pronoun is referential in nature as its basis. 
                                                 
57 Note that many informants disagree on this point (see example (129) and footnote 64 of this chapter). 
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 While Cheng and Huang interpret bare conditionals as involving universal 
quantification over variables introduced by wh-words, they treat ruguo ‘if’-conditionals 
with an E-type pronoun strategy: 58 
 
 (125) a. If someone knocks, then tell the person who knocks to come in. 
           b. If you see someone, please ask the one you see to come see me. 
 
Assuming that Chinese wh-words are polarity items and need a licensor, if a wh-word 
occurs in the consequent clause of a ruguo ‘if’-conditional, it will also need a licenser.59  
The first wh-word in the antecedent clause of a ruguo ‘if’-conditional does not have a 
licensing problem because it can be licensed by the leading element ruguo ‘if’.  Once 
licensed, the wh-word is an existential quantifier subject to Quantifier Raising.  It is then 
adjoined to the antecedent clause IP with its determiner mapped onto an operator position 
and its N’ mapped onto a restrictive clause.  The raised wh-word leaves a trace in the 
nuclear scope.  Thus, within the antecedent clause, the relevant tripartite structure is 
already “complete.”  If a wh-word occurs in the consequent clause, it will not be licensed.  
                                                 
58 Note that Cheng and Huang provide a total of three representations for (8b) repeated here: 
 
(i) If (for some x, (x a person) (x knocks)), then tell him/her to come see me. 
(ii) For every situation (s), if you see someone in (s), please ask him/her to come see me in (s). 
(iii) If you see someone, please ask the one you see to come see me. 
  
The first two representations do not provide representations for the E-type pronoun.  Here we adopt only 
the third representation since the E-type pronoun is properly paraphrased.  
 
59  This follows Cheng (1991, 1995) and Li (1992). 
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Below is the representation of the ruguo ‘if’-conditional in (122b) under Cheng and 
Huang’s account (their (40b)):60   
 
 (126) Ruguo [sheii    [ni    kan-jian  ti ], [  qing     jiao ta/*shei   lai      jian wo].   
               if          who     you see                     please tell  her/who   come see  me 
           ‘If you see someone, please ask him/her to come see me.’ 
 
4.2.2 Lin (1996)    
 Contrary to Cheng and Huang’s claim, Lin (1996) presents the examples in (19), 
repeated here in (127) to show that bare conditionals can occur with a consequent 
pronoun (p. 248-249): 
 
 (127) a. Shang ci     shei  mei jiang-wan, jintian  jiu    you shei/ta    xian kaishi.           
                last     time who not  talk-finish  today   then with who/him first begin 
             ‘Today let’s begin with whoever did not finish his talk last time.’ 
 
 b. Shei shang xueqi       na   di-yi-ming, 
     who last     semester  get  top-one 
     shei/ta  zhe xueqi        jiu   keyi  dan    banzhang. 
              who/he this semester  then may  serve leader  
   ‘Whoever’s performance was the best last semester may/must serve as the       
    class leader this semester.’ 
 
                                                 
60  Note that the authors do not provide a detailed LF-representation to show how exactly the wh-word in 
the antecedent clause of a ruguo ‘if’-conditional is “mapped on to an operator position and its N’ mapped 
onto a restrictive clause.”  I take it that they mean the following: 
 
 (i) [IP Ruguo [DP sheii]               [ni    kan-jian ti ], [IP qing    jiao ta/*shei   lai     jian wo]   
                if              who                 you see                    please tell  her/who  come see  me 
         RESTRICTION    SCOPE 
         ‘If you see someone, please ask him/her to come see me.’ 
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Lin terms Cheng and Huang’s bare conditionals in (121) that disallow the presence of a 
consequent pronoun “multi-case” bare conditionals and his examples in (127) that permit 
the alternation between a pronoun and a wh-word in the consequent clause “one-case” 
bare conditionals.    
 According to Lin, multi-case bare conditionals allow multiple possible individuals 
to satisfy the antecedent clause while one-case bare conditionals can only have a reading 
involving one individual whenever ta ‘he/she’ appears in the consequent clause.  The 
terms “multi-case” and “one-case” come from Kadmon (1987) who distinguishes 
between “one-case” and “multi-case” if-conditionals.  In one-case if-conditionals such as 
If there is a doctor in London, he is Welsh, the donkey pronoun is absolutely unique 
which gives rise to a one-case reading.  However, in a multi-case if-conditional as in If a 
man is in Athens, he is not in Rhodes, the conditional has a multi-case reading.  In a 
similar fashion, Lin claims that multi-case bare conditionals such as (121a) is about 
possible instances of a man coming first and states a universal generalization about such 
instances, whereas his one-case bare conditional in (127a), for instance, is about a 
particular instance of a man not having finished his talk last time.  Under Lin’s account, 
the truth conditions for bare conditionals with two wh-words involve unselective binding, 
regardless of whether they belong to multi-case or one-case.  For one-case bare 
conditionals that contain a consequent pronoun, Lin suggests several solutions to account 
for the uniqueness implication associated with the pronoun including the E-type approach 
and the type-shifting approach.  All are based on the assumption that a consequent 
pronoun in a bare conditional can only refer to a unique (singular) individual.  In the end, 
he does not rest on a particular approach and leaves the status of the anaphoric pronoun in 
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bare conditionals for further research.  I will not review those approaches in detail in this 
section because as we will soon see that his typology for bare conditionals based on 
pronoun occurrence is not adequate.  Nevertheless, it is important to point out that we 
have employed a variant of his type-shifting approach based on Jacobson (1995) to 
account for all cases of bare conditionals (Chapter 2). 
 Lin attempts to show us that one-case bare conditionals are compatible with the 
presence of a consequent pronoun and when the anaphoric wh-phrase is replaced by a 
pronoun, the antecedent wh-phrase must refer to a unique referent and the “more than one 
person” reading disappears (1996, p. 250).  He then proposes a “Condition on Donkey 
Pronouns in Bare Conditionals” (p.251):61 
 
 (20) A donkey pronoun in a bare conditional is felicitous only if it picks out a  
  unique referent. 
 
Lin’s approach to donkey pronouns in bare conditionals follows from Bertrand Russell’s 
classic analysis of definite descriptions which commits to both existence and 
uniqueness. 62   Multi-case bare conditionals in (121) disallow a consequent pronoun 
because the first wh-clause allows multiple possible individuals to satisfy its description 
and the quantificational force is “similar to that of any”.  On the contrary, one-case bare 
conditionals in (127) are compatible with a consequent pronoun because the context 
supplies a unique referent that has the relevant property in the actual world. 
 
                                                 
61 We have mentioned this in Chapter 1. 
62 Note that Lin’s discussion does not include definites outscored by other quantificational or modal 
operators.  Such definites do not commit to either uniqueness or existence under Russell's theory.  I thank 
David Beaver for reminding me of this point (p.c.). 
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4.2.3 Summary of Previous Accounts 
 The tables below summarize the central points of previous accounts:63 
 
Table1. Cheng and Huang (1996): Two types of Conditional Sentences: 





(121a) Shei xian  lai,    shei /*ta   (jiu)   xian  chi. 
           who first come, who/he    then   first  eat  
           ‘If x comes first, x eats first.’ 
 
(122a) Ruguo you   shei qiaomen, 
           if         have  who knock door  
           ni    jiu    jiao  ta            jin-lai. 
           you then ask   him/her come in  
           ‘If someone knocks on the door, you’ll ask  




(121a) ∀x (x come first → x eat first) 
 
(122a) If (for some x, (x a person) (you see x)),   
            then tell him/her to come in. 
 
Form 
presence of pronouns                       no 
presence of ruguo ‘if’                     no 
presence of you ‘exist’                   no 
presence of pronouns                    yes 
presence of ruguo ‘if’                  yes 
presence of you ‘exist’                yes 
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Table2. Lin (1996): Two types of Bare Conditionals 





(121a) Shei xian  lai,    shei /*ta   (jiu)   xian  chi. 
           who first come, who/he    then   first  eat  
           ‘If x comes first, x eats first.’ 
 
(127b) Shei  shangxueqi   na  di-yi-ming,   
           who  last semester get  top-one  
           ta/shei   zhexueqi         jiu   dang banzhang. 
           he/who  this semester  then serve leader         
          ‘Whoever had the best score last semester   






(121a) ∀x (x come first → x eat first) 
The first wh-clause describes a possibility. 
 
 
(i) When two wh-words occur: 
∀x (x has the best score last semester → x can 
serve as the class leader this semester) 
 
(ii) When a pronoun occurs:  
Lin suggests three possible analyses but concludes 





presence of pronouns                       no 
overt leading element ruguo ‘if’     no 
presence of you ‘exist’                   no 
episodic tense/aspect                    no 
presence of pronouns                      yes 
overt leading element ruguo ‘if’    no 
presence of  you ‘exist’                 no 
episodic tense/aspect                   yes 
 
 
4.3 Problems with Previous Accounts on Pronoun Occurrence 
 
4.3.1 The Status of Pronoun in Bare Conditionals: Not an E-type Pronoun 
 As argued in Chapter 2, Cheng and Huang’s unselective binding analysis is not 
adequate to capture the distribution of wh-words in bare conditionals.  We have analyzed 
the anteceding wh-phrase in a bare conditional as a definite description and its anaphoric 
element in the second clause (a pronoun or a second wh-word) as a variable.  So could a 
pronoun in a bare conditional be a donkey pronoun?  The answer to this question appears 
to be a negative one.   
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 An E-type pronoun is plural in form if its antecedent is plural (as shown in (120)).  
However, a pronoun in a bare conditional must be singular even when the discourse 
makes it clear that its antecedent has a plural reading: 
 
 (128) A: Zuowan   you        hen   duo    xuesheng zai  waimian dajia.   
     last night there be very many  student    at    outside   fight. 
   Tamen dou bei         fa-le             ma? 
      they    all   Passive  punish-Perf  question particle 
     ‘There were many students in a fight outside last night.  Were they all  
    punished?’ 
 
            B: Shei  da-le-jia,        shei/ta/*tamen    (jiu)   bei           fa.      
    who  fight-Perfect  who/(s)he/*they (then) Passive   punish 
    Naxie xuesheng dajia bushi diyici. 
    those  student     fight not     first time 
 ‘Whoever fought was punished.  It was not the first time that those 
  students were in a fight.’  
 
The speaker in (128B) explicitly states that multiple students were punished and the 
anaphoric element in the bare conditional can only be a singular pronoun.  This suggests 
that the pronoun in a bare conditional is not the same as an E-type pronoun that allows 
plural.        
 Although Cheng and Huang claim that a Chinese pronoun cannot be directly 
bound by an operator in an Ā-position (see the examples in (124) taken from Aoun and Li 
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(1989, 1990)), this does not mean that a pronoun can never be a bound variable in 
Chinese.  In fact, a pronoun can be a bound variable as the following examples show:64 
 
 (129) a. Meigereni    dou shuo Lisi xihuan tai. 
   everyone      all   say   Lisi like     him 
  ‘Everyone said Lisi likes him.’ 
  
           b. Meige i bei       ta i mama   da  de   ren      dou shuo  tai  pigu hen   tong. 
    every   Passive his mother hit Rel  person all   say   his butt  very hurt 
    ‘Everyone who was beaten by his mother says his butt hurts.’ 
 
Chinese permits a pronoun to be a bound variable after all.  Our account that treats a 
pronoun as a variable in the consequent clause of a bare conditional is in accord with the 
nature of ta ‘he/she’. 
 
4.3.2 Problems with Lin’s Assumptions on Pronoun Occurrence: Data against Lin’s 
Constraint on Pronoun Occurrence 
Based on Lin’s study, a pronoun in a bare conditional cannot be felicitous in the 
following situations: (i) when they do not have actual unique referents; (ii) when they are 
used to refer to an NP whose determiner is renhe ‘any’ or mei ‘every’; (iii) when their 
                                                 
64 The example in (129a) is taken from Aoun and Li (1989) (their (30a)).  According to their study, a 
Chinese pronoun can be bound by a quantifier as long as it is Ā-free in its domain.  The pronoun in the 
example in (129a) is Ā-free in the embedded clause and so it can be Ā-bound by meigeren ‘everyone’ 
which occurs outside of this domain.  Chinese lacks Agr (following Huang 1982), the pronoun is not free in 
the examples in (124), hence cannot be interpreted as a bound variable.  Unlike Chinese, Agr is present in 
English, hence the acceptability of (i) (p. 154): 
 
(i) Everyonei [xi said [hei Agr is a fool]]. 
 
However, many native speakers (monolinguals) consider (124) to be acceptable on the pronoun-as-bound-
variable reading.  All consider (129) to be acceptable.  The important thing to be pointed out here is that a 
pronoun can be a bound variable in Chinese, even though speakers have different intuition with regard to 
what its legitimate binder may be.  This is an interesting topic for future research. 
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antecedents are plural.  In what follows, we show that Lin’s generalizations for the use of 
pronoun in bare conditionals are not tenable within or outside bare conditionals. 
 
4.3.2.1 The Referent of ta ‘she/he’ Can be a Possible Individual 
 While it is true that bare conditionals can admit consequent pronouns as Lin 
claims provided examples such as (127) (same as (19)), we have reasons to suspect that 
his “Condition on Donkey Pronouns in Bare Conditionals” (in (20)) may not be adequate.  
If we understand the motivation and the basis of Lin’s constraint correctly, it rules out all 
cases of bare conditionals that contain a pronoun whose antecedent fails to refer to a 
unique individual that satisfies relevant properties in the actual world.   
 Unnoticed in Lin’s study, a pronoun can occur in a bare conditional even when it 
fails to pick out a unique individual that exists in the real world.  Compare his example in 
(127b) repeated here in (130a) with the example in (130b) below: 
 
 (130) a. Shei shang xueqi       na   di-yi-ming, 
     who last     semester  get  top-one 
     shei/ta  zhe xueqi       jiu   keyi/bixu  dan    banzhang. 
              who/he this semester then may/must serve leader  
   ‘Whoever’s performance was the best last semester may/must serve as the       
    class leader this semester.’ 
 
          b. (Genju        xuixiao   de    guiding), shei   shangxueqi     na    di-yi-ming, 
                according  school    DE   rule         who   last semester  get   top-one  
                          ta/shei   zhexueqi         jiu      keyi   dang   banzhang.   
               he/who  this semester  then   can    serve   leader          
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                ‘(According to the rule of the school) whoever had the best score last  
    semester can serve as the class leader this semester. 
 
According to Lin, the bare conditional in (130a) has episodic tense/aspect and the set of 
individuals characterized by the first wh-clause are actual individuals.  Whenever the 
anaphoric wh-word is replaced by a pronoun in the consequent clause, the antecedent wh-
phrase must refer to a unique referent and the “more than one person” reading disappears 
(p. 250).  However, the same bare conditional with a consequent pronoun uttered in a 
context by a school-principal, for instance, the donkey pronoun ta ‘he/she’ does not pick 
out a single actual unique individual that has the relevant property.  The added adverbial 
phrase gen ju xuixiao de guiding ‘according to the rules of the school’ helps to set up this 
generic context.  Precisely, (130b) states that according to the rules of the school, 
whoever has the best score in the first semester can serve as the class-leader in the 
second semester.  The antecedent wh-phrase in (130b) does not refer to a particular 
individual who satisfies the relevant description in the actual world.  However, the bare 
conditional is well-formed.  Though one-case bare conditionals have episodic 
tense/aspect, they can be placed in a generic context.  As a generic statement, the pronoun 
in (130b) does not have an antecedent that corresponds to an actual single unique 
individual.  It appears to be the case that Lin’s constraint in (20) is too strong.  It 
incorrectly predicts that a pronoun in a bare conditional always picks up an actual unique 
individual. 
 We find that a pronoun can occur in a bare conditional even when no individual in 
the actual world satisfies the conjuncts.  This is true not only for a pronoun in a bare 
 116
conditional used as a generic statement as shown in (130b), but also for the pronoun in 
the following example has episodic tense/aspect:  
  
(131) Dengyixia  shei mei jiang-wan,  mingtian   jiu     you shei/ta    xian kaishi.           
             later           who not  talk-finish  tomorrow  then  let   who/him first begin 
         ‘Tomorrow let’s begin with whoever does not finish his talk later.’ 
 
The pronoun in (131) does not pick up an actual individual that satisfies the description 
of the conjuncts, and the bare conditional is well-formed. 
That the use of the pronoun ta ‘he/she’ does not require its referent to be an actual 
and unique individual also finds evidence in naturally occurring data.  Consider the 
following examples retrieved from the web:65 
 
(132) a. Jintian shei  yao  keqituituo, women jiu    fa        ta           liangbei.               
              today  who want polite         we        then punish him/her two cup 
             ‘Today we will punish with two more drinks whoever wants to be polite.’ 
 
          b. Fu          qi     zhijian    chuangtou da     chuangwei he, 
              husband wife between bed head   fight  bed end      reconcile 
              neng you   shenme en        cho      ne?   
              can   have what      mercy  hatred  question particle  
               zai     buxing,   jiu    yue     fa     san    zhang,  
              again  not able  then  make  law  three chapter 
             shei yao   renbuzhu   dapo   le       guiju, jiu    fa    ta          tuo   di  
              who want endure not break PERF rule    then fine him/her mop floor  
              san    tian! 
              three days 
                                                 
65 Retrieved August 13, 2009, from 小说之家->书库首页->围城 
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    ‘It is usually the case between a husband and a wife that they will fight 
     and reconcile.  How can there be any hatred? If this does not work, then  
     simply make up a rule.  Whoever cannot endure and breaks the rule will 
     mop the floor for three days!’  
  
In the contexts of (132), pronouns do not pick up individuals that actually satisfy relevant 
descriptions in the actual world.  Likewise, the following examples show that a pronoun 
in a bare conditional can be felicitous even if the context does not supply an individual 
that satisfies the relevant description in the actual world:66 
 
(133) a. 誰要遊戲人生，他就一事無成.  
   Shei yao   youxi  rensheng, ta       jiu   yishi        wo cheng. 
    who want play    life           (s)he then one thing no  achieve 
    ‘Whoever wants to squander his life will achieve nothing.’ 
 
          b. 誰有本事把一堆垃圾搬進美術館展覽, 他就被稱為藝術家?   
               Shei  you  benshi ba  yi-dui  lese  banjin       meishuguan zhanlan,  
               who  have guts    BA a pile  trash move into art museum display 
              ta      jiu     bei         chengwei yishujia? 
             (s)he  then  Passive  call           artist 
             ‘Whoever has the courage to bring a pile of trash to be displayed in a 
               museum will be called an artist?’     
 
Worst of all, Lin’s constraint cannot be extended to account for pronoun occurrence in 
ordinary ruguo ‘if’-conditionals where ta ‘he/she/it’ refers to a hypothetical non-actual 
individual: 
 
                                                 
66 The naturally occurring examples in (133) were originally written in Chinese orthography. 
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 (134) Ruguo you   shei qifu   ni,     wo    jiu   qu  da ta. 
                 if         have who bully you    I       then go hit he/she 
                ‘If someone bullies you, I’ll go hit him/her.’ 
 
It is safe to conclude that if there is a constraint on pronoun occurrence in bare 
conditionals, it has nothing to do with whether or not a pronoun can refer to an actual 
individual that satisfies relevant properties.   
 
4.3.2.2 Ta ‘he/she’ Can be Anaphoric to Renhe ‘any’ NPs 
Lin claims that bare conditionals that disallow a consequent pronoun or other 
anaphoric elements as in (121) have the quantificational force “similar to that of any” 
while those that contain a pronoun do not.  However, bare conditionals with a pronoun 
can also have a renhe ‘any’-reading.  The bare conditional in (133a) can have the 
following paraphrase where the wh-phrase has a reading similar to any: 
 
 (135) Renheren yao   youxi  rensheng, ta   jiu   yishi        wo cheng. 
           anyone     want play    life           he then one thing no  achieve 
          ‘Anyone who squanders her/his life will achieve nothing.’ 
 
 Even in ordinary discourse outside bare conditionals, ta ‘he/she’ can take a renhe 
‘any’-NP as its antecedent as shown in the following examples:67 
 
 (136) a. 任何一個男人的優點，都是以他的缺點作為代價。 
              Rehhe yige nanren de  youdian  dou shi yi   tade quedian      zuowei daijia. 
    any    one   man    DE  virtue     all   be use  his  shortcoming as        price 
                                                 
67 Retrieved July 13, 2009, from http://tw.myblog.yahoo.com/jo-a/article 
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  ‘Any man’s strong points use his shortcomings as the price.’ 
 
  b. 任何一個銷售員他唯一的一個任務是銷售. 
    Rehhe yige xiaoshouyuan, ta  weiyi     de   yige renwu   shi xiaoshou. 
      any     one   salesman         his only one DE one mission be  sell 
     ‘Any salesman, his only mission is to sell.’ 
 
Once again, Lin’s generalizations for the use of pronoun do not hold within or outside 
bare conditionals. 
 
4.3.2.3 Ta ‘he/she’ can have Plural Antecedents 
Another implication of Lin’s generalization for the use of pronoun in bare 
conditionals is that when a pronoun occurs in a bare conditional, its wh-antecedent cannot 
be plural.  He claims that when a pronoun occurs in a bare conditional, the antecedent 
wh-phrase must refer to a unique referent and the “more than one person” reading 
disappears (1996, p. 250).  However, contrary to Lin’s observation, the presence of ta 
‘he/she’ does not rule out a “more than one person” reading in the following bare 
conditionals:  
 
 (137) a. 誰敢說雷鋒故事是編的就找他拼命.68 
  Shei gan shuo Leifeng gushi shi biande      jiu   zhao ta      pinming. 
  who dare say  Leifeng  story be  fabricated then seek (s)he defy death 
 ‘We will defy with our might whoever dared to/dares to say Leifeng’s 
 story is fabricated.’ 
 




      Shei xiang rang wo si,    wo jiu    xian rang ta      si. 
      who want  let     I    die   I    then  first let   (s)he  die  
      ‘I will let whoever wants/wanted me to die, die first.’ 
 
While it is likely that only one individual says/said Leifeng’s story is fabricated in (137a), 
it is also possible, that more than one person has this property.  Likewise, the presence of 
the pronoun in (137b) does not rule out the “more than one person reading,” contrary to 
Lin’s claim.  Our account analyzes the anteceding wh-phrase and its anaphoric element as 
definites denoting a maximal plural entity (Chapter 2).  This maximal plural entity can be 
an atomic entity resulting in a singular definite reading, or, it can be an entity that 
consists of more than one atom deriving a universal-like (“more than one person”) 
reading.  Regardless of how many individuals have the relevant property, quantification 
in bare conditionals can be covered under our account. 
Outside bare conditionals, the pronoun ta ‘he/she’ can also be anaphoric to a 
plural NP (cf. Zhang 2005; Xu 1999).  In each of the following examples, ta ‘he/she’ has 
a plural antecedent (from Xu 1999): 
 
(138) a. Zhexie jiahuo, zhineng     dui ta    bukeqi.  
  these   chap     cannot but to  3SG impolite 
  ‘As for these chaps, (we) cannot but be impolite to them.’ 
 
            b. Zhe bang  xiaotou, jingcha hengude        sha      le     ta. 
                 this  gang thieves,  police   would-rather kill      ASP him 
               ‘This gang of thieves, the police would rather kill them.’ 
                                                 
69 http://www.sslou.com/sslouinfo/0/584/1358108.shtml 
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These sentences are acceptable with the singular pronoun taking a plural antecedent.  
Again, Lin’s constraint on pronoun occurrence does not find support within or outside of 
Chinese bare conditionals. 
 
4.4 Explanations for the (In)compatibility of Bare Conditionals with Pronouns 
In this section we approach the problem of pronoun occurrence in bare 
conditionals by dividing the discussion into two sub-sections.  First, we show that the 
occurrence of inanimate ta ‘it’ in bare conditionals follows from a general principle of the 
language in that the inanimate ta ‘it’ is rarely used to refer to inanimate entities.  In the 
second part of the discussion, we consider two possibilities to explain the 
(in)compatibility of bare conditionals with the animate pronoun ta ‘he/she’.  Though bare 
conditionals typically contain two identical wh-words, they may occur naturally with ta 
‘he/she’ when ta ‘he/she’ is able to serve its function as a discourse chaining device.  It is 
also possible that bare conditionals with two identical wh-words have a parallel structure 
that may not be interrupted by the presence of a pronoun.  
  
4.4.1 Constraints on the Use of Inanimate ta ‘it’ 
 We can rule out the use of inanimate ta ‘it’ in bare conditionals by appealing to a 
general constraint that Chinese imposes on its uses.  In Mandarin, the pronoun ta ‘it’ is 
rarely used to refer to inanimate entities.  As a response to speaker A’s question in (139), 
the answer in B without the pronoun ta ‘it’ is appropriate, while the one in B’ with the 
pronoun is not: 
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(139) A: Ni   xihuan nei-ben   shu      ma? 
    You like     that-CL   book   Q-Particle 
              ‘Do you like that book?’ 
 
         B: Wo xihuan. 
    I     like 
   ‘I like it.’ 
 
         B’: ?? Wo xihuan ta.   
          I     like      it 
           ‘I like it.’     (cf. Li and Thompson 1981) 
 
Similarly, we can rule out bare conditionals with wh-words standing for inanimate NPs:70 
 
 (140) Ni    kanjian shenme, ni     jiu   hui  dedao shenme/*ta.  
           you see        what       you then will get      what/it 
          ‘You will get whatever you see.’ 
  
 (141) Gege     you  shenme, wo jiu    ye   yao   you   shenme/*ta. 
           brother have what       I    then also want have what/*it 
           ‘I want to have whatever my brother has.’ 
 
It turns out that the use of third person inanimate pronoun is generally excluded in the 
language, not just in bare conditionals. 
 
4.4.2 The Discourse Function of Animate ta ‘he/she’ 
                                                 
70 The example in (140) is taken from Cheng and Huang (1996) and (141) from Lin (1996, 1998). 
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  Third person pronouns have an important role to play in promoting discourse 
coherence by linking separate utterances into a model of discourse (Gordon, Grosz & 
Gilliom 1993; Grosz, Joshi & Weinstein 1995).  Whether or not a speaker will use a 
pronoun to pick up a discourse entity often depends on how the speaker intends for the 
discourse to be structured in a certain way.  Chinese third person pronouns, null or overt, 
serve to link sentences into a coherent chunk of discourse and tend to pick up the most 
salient entity under discussion.  Bare conditionals allow the alternation between a wh-
word and the pronoun ta ‘he/she’ in the second clause, particularly when its intended 
antecedent is the most salient thing under discussion (or a topic).71  Compare Cheng and 
Huang’s bare conditional in (121b) detached from context (repeated here in (142a)) to the 
one in (142b) that does not occur in isolation: 
 
(142) a. Ni    xihuan shei, shei/*ta    (jiu)     daomei. 
              you  like      who who/(s)he  then    unlucky 
  ‘Whoever you like will be/is unlucky.’ 
 
         b. Wo bu shidao shei doamei.  Ni    xihuan shei, shei/ta     (jiu)   daomei! 
              I     not know who unlucky you  like      who who/(s)he then  unlucky 
 ‘I don’t know who will be/is unlucky.  Whoever you like will 
 be/is unlucky.’ 
 
                                                 
71 Pronouns that indicate topics are formal devices that link clauses together to form a discourse unit—a 
topic chain.  Tsao (1988) characterizes topic chain as sentences under the domain of a topic (what the 
discourse is about).  According to Li and Thompson (1981), a topic chain is “where a referent is referred to 
in the first clause and then there follow several more clauses talking about the same referent (p. 659).  Here 
I do not wish to discuss topic and topic chain in detail and focus only on making known that the use of 
pronoun in bare conditionals can be felicitous if the discourse is structured in a certain way. 
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Cheng and Huang’s bare conditional in (142a) is not compatible with a pronoun.  
However, the pronoun can occur naturally in the same bare conditional in (142b).  It links 
the bare conditional and the sentence preceding it into a coherent piece of discourse.  
Note that the bare conditional in (142b) has an ignorance reading as the most prominent 
reading.  It is very tempting to make a clear distinction between ignorance and 
indifference bare conditionals based on the presence of a pronoun and to claim that bare 
conditionals that occur with a pronoun always have an ignorance reading and those that 
occur with two identical wh-words always have an indifference reading.  Unfortunately, 
this claim does not hold since the indifference reading is also available in (142b) and 
does not disappear because of the presence of ta ‘he/she’.      
 What we can be certain of is the fact that a pronoun in a bare conditional can be 
felicitous if the context is set up in a way that its function as a discourse chaining device 
can be served.  It is beyond the scope of this dissertation to examine the exact constraints 
that govern the use of pronouns in Mandarin.  In the next section, we only ask why 
Cheng and Huang’s bare conditionals (cf. (142a) and (121)) dislike the presence of a 
pronoun.  I suspect that there may be a general tendency among speakers to preserve the 
parallel structure in bare conditionals that make the occurrence of a pronoun difficult. 
 
4.4.3 Speaker’s Preference for Parallel Construction 
 The use of parallel sequences is a well-known stylistic feature in Western 
literature.  In the West, the notion of parallelism is primary associated with the rhetoric of 
classical antiquity.72   In Chinese, however, parallelism appears more frequently and 
                                                 
72 In the Greek and Latin classics, Hebrew poetry and classical Arabic texts (Koranic and post-Koranic), the 
type of parallelism is limited to the function of rhetorical ornamentation. 
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rigorously.  In fact, parallelism in Chinese is a natural mode of utterance rather than the 
objective of rhetorical manipulation.  Roughly, we can define parallelism in Chinese 
quoting Gustave Schlegel (following Plaks 1988): 
 
In two parallel phrases the rules of Chinese style demand that all the parts 
correspond to each other: the subject to the subject, the verb to the verb, 
the noun to the noun, the adjective to the adjective, the adverb to the 
adverb, the place name to the place name, the sign of the genitive to the 
sign of the genitive, the object to the object, etc. 
 
More concretely, we may say that clause X and clause Y are parallel when they are 
involved in the following way (cf. Needham 1998): 
 
(143) a. X and Y are the opposite to each other. 
                 b. X and Y are identical and have the same meaning. 
         c. X and Y are synonymous. 
         d. X and Y are in alliteration, reduplication, and rhyme. 
         e. X and Y are the same/similar in length. 
 
An example of parallelism can be found in the following passage from the Analects: 
 
(144) 不亦悅乎﹐ 不亦樂乎 
          Bu   yi   yue     hu,            bu yi     le         hu. 
          not  also joyful question   not also happy  question 
          ‘Is it also not joyful, is it also not happy?’  
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In (144), the first and the second clause are the same length.  There are four words in 
each clause.  Phonetic recurrence is also observed.  The first and the second clause are in 
alliteration and in rhyme.  Moreover, the predicate yue ‘joyful’ in the first clause 
corresponds to le ‘happy’ in the second clause.  They are synonymous to each other. 
 A similar pattern is also observed in the structure of bare conditionals that do not 
occur naturally with a pronoun.  Cheng and Huang’s examples in (121) repeated here in 
(145) display the features of parallelism just defined in (143):  
 
(145) a. Shei   xian   lai,      shei /?ta   (jiu)   xian  chi. 
        who   first   come,  who/(s)he then  first   eat  
      ‘If x comes first, x eats first.’  
        
         b. Ni    xihuan shei, shei/?ta     jiu     daomei. 
                 you  like      who who/(s)he  then  unlucky 
             ‘If you like x, x is unlucky.’ 
 
Not only are the first and the second clause in the bare conditionals above are the same in 
length, they also have verb phrases that correspond to each other.  In (145a), xian lai 
‘first come’ is parallel to xian chi ‘first eat’.  In (145b), xihuan ‘like’ is paired with 
daomei ‘unlucky’.  Two identical wh-words in bare conditionals produce a pattern of 
phonetic recurrence--alliteration, reduplication, and rhyme.  They also shape the two 
clauses into balanced coordinates, self-contained single unit.  If a pronoun occurs in the 
second clause in these bare conditionals, it will disrupt the pattern of phonetic recurrence 
and destroy the parallelism.  Naturally occurring examples of bare conditionals that have 
a parallel structure are shown in (146) below:  
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(146) a. 馬英九誰碰到誰倒楣.73 
     Ma Yingjiu shei  pengdao  shei  daomei. 
     Ma Yingjiu who run into    who unlucky      
  ‘Ma Yingjiu, whoever ran into him will became/is unlucky.’ 
 
          b. 神要怜悯谁就怜悯谁74 
    Shen yao  lianming shei  jiu    lianming shei,  
    God want pity         who then  pity       who 
 ‘God will pity/pities whoever he wishes to pity.’ 
 
     c. 誰先愛了，誰就輸了75 
   Shei xian ai-le,             shei jiu     shu-le. 
              who first  love-PERF   who then  loose-PERF 
‘Whoever fell in love first looses/lost.’ 
 
 d. 誰做假誰負責76 
     Shei zuojia         shei fuze. 
    who counterfeit who responsible                 
   ‘Whoever counterfeited takes the responsibility.’ 
 
 e. 妳愛嫁誰就嫁誰77 
     Ni     ai     jia       shei  jiu   jia        shei. 
                you love marry  who then marry  who 
     ‘Marry whoever you are in love with.’ 
 





77 www.atlaspost.com/landmark-4406480.htm - Taiwan 
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Parallelism in the bare conditionals in (146) all display the features of parallelism in 
Chinese defined in (143) illustrated in the following table:  
 

















3 vs. 3 alliteration  




4 vs. 4 final rhyme 




4 vs. 4 alliteration 
end rhyme 




3 vs. 3 alliteration 
(e)  shei… shei   
‘who…who’ 
aijia… jia 
‘love to marry…marry’ 
3 vs. 3  end rhyme 
 
 
Parallelism pervades most compositions in literary Chinese and affects any level 
of the text (Nienhauser & Hartman 1998, p. 96-97).  In Baguwen 八股文 ‘Eight-part 
Essay’, it is a major principle ordering the presentation of the entire themes and 
arguments.78  In p'ien-wen or ‘parallel prose’ parallelism orders the syntax of each distich 
in the composition.  In Lǜ-shi ‘regulated verse’, it orders the rhythmic alternation of 
contrasting tone values for each graph in the couplet.  In the Chinese literary medium, we 
find strict matching, word for word, syllable for syllable, parallel clauses and parallel 
lines, as well as patterns of phonetic recurrence (alliteration, reduplication, and rhyme).  
The use of strictly parallel sequences is a pervasive pattern in Chinese writing, a natural 
                                                 
78 Baguwen ‘Eight-part Essay’ is a style of Chinese traditional writings specifically for imperial 
examinations in the Ming and Qing dynasties. 
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mode of utterance, and a fundamental feature of the Chinese spoken language itself.  
Vernacular works also manifest a wide array of rhetorical effects based on parallelism (cf. 
Nienhauser & Harman 1998).   
It is very likely that speakers prefer paired wh-words in bare conditionals with 
paired verb phrases and matching numbers of morphemes because there is a general 
tendency to create and preserve the parallel structure as a central principle of composition 
in Chinese literary tradition and a fundamental feature of the Chinese spoken language 
itself.  The presence of a pronoun is not desired because it can disrupt the parallel 
structure of bare conditionals that contain paired verb phrases, matching numbers of 
morphemes, and phonetic recurrences.  From this we predict that when two clauses do 
not have a parallel structure, a bare conditional should occur naturally with a pronoun.  
The examples in (133) and (137) appear to support this point.  The bare conditionals in 
those examples contain a pronoun and they do not have the parallel structure we just saw 
with the examples in (146).    
While it is possible that speakers prefer a parallel structure, further work must 
examine whether utterances containing bare conditionals with identical wh-words 
produce a certain rhetorical effect that is not found in those that contain a pronoun. 
 
4.5 Conclusion 
In the beginning of this chapter, I provided the theoretical background for donkey 
sentences by introducing E-type pronouns and donkey sentences in relation to conditional 
donkey sentences in Chinese.  Then, I reviewed two important analyses from Cheng and 
Huang (1996) and Lin (1996) and showed that a pronoun in a bare conditional does not 
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display characteristics of E-type pronouns.  I provided possible explanations to the puzzle 
of pronoun occurrence in bare conditionals and showed that pronoun occurrence in 
Chinese in general (within or outside of bare conditionals) is not subject to Lin’s 
uniqueness and existence constraint.  I suggested that although bare conditionals typically 
contain two identical wh-words, they may occur naturally with ta ‘he/she’.  This happens 
when ta ‘he/she’ is able to serve its function as a discourse chaining device linking the 
bare conditional with other sentences into a coherent discourse.  It is also possible that 
bare conditionals that do not occur naturally with a pronoun have a parallel structure.  
The occurrence of two identical wh-words preserves the parallel pattern.  If a pronoun 
occurs, it will disrupt the parallel structure and is not desired.    
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At first glance, the structure of bare conditionals struck us as something as alien 
as Tribbles, the extraterrestrial furry creatures in Star Trek.79  Or worse, we may consider 
bare conditionals as lesser a creature than a Tribble.  As strange as Tribbles look, they are 
identifiable to say the least.  No Treky would mistake a Tribble with an Ewok from Star 
Wars, though both creatures are furry.  On the contrary, everything we knew about bare 
conditionals was confusing and no consensus could be reached as to how to best 
characterize them.  The literature on Chinese bare conditionals is full of conflict, 
controversy, and mystery.  Cheng and Huang (1996) treat their meaning as the same as 
that of ordinary hypothetical conditionals.  Lin (1996) suspects that bare conditionals 
may not be “conditionals” at all and calls for more research on their quantification.  Most 
scholars translate bare conditionals into English using sentences with whatever, whoever, 
etc., but are often times troubled by the fact that the translation between the two does not 
go both ways.  For the first time, this dissertation investigates the form and meaning of 
Chinese bare conditionals from several aspects of linguistics (syntactic, pragmatic, 
semantic, historical) and inquires into the nature of the Chinese language to describe the 
nature of this construction.  By doing so, we discovered that the structure of Chinese bare 
conditionals belongs to a part of a general phenomenon in Chinese.  The form of Chinese 
bare conditionals reflects a paratactic sentence pattern that sentences in ordinary 
discourse exhibit in the Chinese language.  Although bare conditionals occur with no 
overt linking element, the default relationship between the two clauses is that of a causal 
                                                 
79 See Star Trek “The Trouble with Tribbles” (1967). 
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one.  Although bare conditionals do not involve relativization, their quantification is 
similar to that of Hindi left-adjoined correlatives and English –ever clauses.  This 
contrasts sharply with Cheng and Huang’s study where bare conditionals are treated as 
unrelated to correlatives/free relatives.  By placing bare conditionals back in context, we 
saw a sharp contrast between the use of bare conditionals and ordinary hypothetical 
ruguo ‘if’-conditionals. 
 Reflecting on previous works on Chinese bare conditionals, I showed that 
although bare conditionals appear similar to ordinary ruguo ‘if’-conditionals in the forms 
that they exhibit, they actually differ greatly in that a hypothetical ruguo ‘if’-conditional 
is typically used to make a hypothetical assumption, while this is not the case with a bare 
conditional.  The antecedent clause of a hypothetical conditional expresses a proposition, 
while the first clause of a bare conditional has the meaning of a NP ambiguous between a 
singular definite and plural definite reading.  Bare conditionals also differ from 
hypothetical ruguo ‘if’-conditionals with respect to the distribution of wh-words.  While 
wh-words behave like definites in bare conditionals, they are like indefinites in ruguo 
‘if’-conditionals.  This contrasts sharply with previous works including Cheng and Huang 
(1996) and Lin (1996) that claim that bare conditionals with two identical wh-words are 
genuine if p, q conditionals. 
Concerning quantification, I proposed a unified treatment similar to the analysis 
of Jacobson (1995) for English FRs to capture the quantificational force of wh-phrases in 
bare conditionals.  The antecedent wh-phrase is an iota expression and the pronoun/wh-
word in the second clause has the interpretation of a bound variable.  The anteceding wh-
phrase and its anaphoric element are uniformly treated as definites denoting a maximal 
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plural entity.  This maximal plural entity can be an atomic entity resulting in a singular 
definite reading.  Alternatively, it can be an entity that consists of more than one atom 
deriving a universal-like reading.  Previous accounts of wh-phrases including works such 
as Lin (1996, 1998) and Chierchia (2000) do not consider the fact that wh-phrases can be 
definites and leave behind pieces of puzzles as a result.  While Chierchia (2000) 
(following Cheng and Huang (1996)) has a difficult time trying to explain why wh-
phrases as “indefinites” in bare conditionals are not subject to the novelty condition, the 
present account that considers wh-phrases in bare conditionals as definites can spare any 
theorist from such postulation.  While the nature of wh-phrases in bare conditionals 
remained a mystery in Lin (1998) in displaying uncharacteristic properties that his 
proposal cannot explain, the present account is able to predict the existence of anaphoric 
definite wh-phrases in bare conditionals as well as in naturally occurring data.  It also 
bears an implication for the study of the distribution of Chinese wh-phrases in being able 
to provide an explanation to the puzzle raised in Lin (1998).   
With regard to modal implication, a topic that has not been discussed in previous 
works, I pointed out that although bare conditionals can also have ignorance or 
indifference readings like whatever, the primary function of bare conditionals is not to 
signal ignorance but to assert indifference.  I proposed to capture the agent’s/speaker’s 
indifference reading of bare conditionals with von Fintel’s semantics of whatever, but 
suggested that his analysis may not be well-suited for whatever after all.  The 
indifference reading in von Fintel’s analysis is interpreted against a counterfactual modal 
base which implies temporality and predicts a causal link.  While we have evidence from 
bare conditionals that a counterfactual semantics is adequate in capturing the agent’s 
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indifference reading, it may not be applied directly to whatever.  This is because a causal 
link is necessarily present in a bare conditional, but not required in an English whatever-
sentence.  While the first wh-clause in a bare conditional is adjoined to the left of the 
main clause, a whatever-clause is generated in an argument position.  These differences 
between bare conditionals and whatever-sentences contribute to the problem of 
translation between these two constructions. 
In addressing the problem of pronoun occurrence, I claimed that a pronoun in a 
bare conditional does not display the characteristics of a donkey pronoun.  I also showed 
that though bare conditionals typically contain two identical wh-words, they may occur 
naturally with ta ‘he/she’.  This happens when ta ‘he/she’ is able to link bare conditionals 
with other sentences into a piece of coherent discourse.  Then, I entertained the 
possibility that bare conditionals with two identical wh-words have a parallel structure 
that may not be interrupted by the presence of a pronoun.  Whether bare conditionals with 
parallel structure (which contain two identical wh-words) differ from those that do not 
(which occur with a pronoun) in producing a certain rhetorical effect remains to be seen.  
Future research must also examine the exact constraints that govern the use of pronouns 
in Mandarin.  
To sum up, let us restate the questions that came up in the present study: 
 
1. What is the full spectrum of properties that wh-phrases display?  In this 
dissertation, we saw that wh-phrases can behave like anaphoric definites.  I 
suspect that there may be other uses of wh-phrases that are not documented in 
the literature simply because they do not fit in the prototypical description of 
indefinites wh-phrases meaning ‘something, someone’. 
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2. What is the nature of the Chinese third person pronoun ta ‘he/she/it’?  While 
some scholars argue that ta ‘he/she/it’ cannot be bound, others claim that it 
can.  Why do native speakers show different intuitions about this?  What are 
the exact constraints that govern the use of ta ‘he/she/it’?   
 
3. What is the invariant meaning of English whatever?  The so-called “ignorance 
presupposition” in von Fintel (2000) turned out that be a kind of inference 
accommodated only when certain conditions are met, but what is the 
mechanism responsible for all possible inferences that -ever produces? 
 
In the process of investigating the meaning and form of Chinese bare conditionals 
I found a certain gap that exists between the different fields of Chinese linguistics.  
Works on formal syntax are typically produced by extracting patterns from sentences that 
are detached from contexts without noticing that the use of certain elements such as that 
of pronouns cannot be analyzed without considering their role in discourse.  Studies on 
formal semantics are often conducted with no reference to pragmatic factors.  The 
presence of the gap between the field of Chinese syntax, semantics/pragmatics, and other 
areas of linguistics is also due to the fact that the majority of papers submitted to 
conferences on Chinese linguistics are syntax-oriented, according to the statistics of 
Huang, Li, and Li (2009).  This is unsurprising since Chinese is a language that does not 
have a long tradition of linguistic scholarship like English and many other Indo-European 
languages.  Very little was known about the linguistics of Modern Chinese.  In fact, not 
until the past quarter of a century have we started to see works on Modern Chinese 
appear in academic journals published in the west.  The study of syntax alone cannot give 
us a full picture of the state of the language.  In this dissertation, I explained the meaning 
and form of Chinese bare conditionals including quantification, presupposition, 
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entailment, and pronoun occurrence not confined to a particular viewpoint.  Though the 
outcome of my arguments remains to be seen, and they leave questions for future 
research, I hope to have shown the urgency of presenting a coherent view that bridges the 
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